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1. Introduction 
1.1. Economic Crisis, EU Merger Control and the Failing Firm Defence 
The 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent economic recession have affected the 
European Union (EU) in a number of ways. Besides staggering economic growth, rising 
unemployment and harsh austerity measures that have affected many of the Member 
States, EU law has also been affected by the crisis.
1
 On the field of EU competition law the 
impact of the crisis on the interpretation of state aid rules has been widely discussed.
2
  The 
effects of the crisis on other sectors of EU competition law, such as merger control 
practiced by the European Commission, have not been covered as broadly.
3
  
However, predictions concerning the likely effects the crisis might have on merger control 
have been presented. Economic downturn is expected to cause financial difficulties to 
companies. The firms that are distressed the most might have to seek refuge by merging 
with healthier competitors. Therefore during an economic crisis competition authorities – 
including the European Commission – are expected to face more merger cases where the 
other party of the transaction is a failing firm. Moreover competition authorities are 
expected to face more cases in which the merging parties invoke the failing of the target 
company as a reason to approve their transaction.
4
 In merger control this is known as the 
failing firm defence.  
According to Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation, a merger “which would significantly 
impede effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it…shall be 
declared incompatible with the common market”.5 Unlike antitrust enforcement EU merger 
control is practiced on an ex ante basis as the European Commission assesses mergers and 
acquisitions – or concentrations – before they take place in order to assure that those 
                                                          
1
 For instance the compatibility of the ad hoc solutions – that later gained more institutionalised structures – 
which the Member States belonging to the Eurozone had to come up with in order to reassure the markets 
about the stability of the single currency, with EU law has been debated. See e.g. Craig (2013), p. 457–517. 
2
 During the financial meltdown some of the major European banks were on the verge of bankruptcy. The 
Member States wished to avoid the bankruptcies since the effects were estimated to be catastrophic. 
However, the decisions to finance and save the banks were controversial in relation to state aid rules of the 
EU. See e.g. Nordström (2015).  
3
 One noticeable feature in EU merger control has been the lower number of mergers notified to the 
Commission following the economic downturn. The number of notifications came down by 35 per cent in 
2009 from 2007. During the years 2010–2014 the amount of notifications still did not reach the levels of the 
pre-crisis years 2005–2008. See European Commission website, Merger Control Statistics, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf.  
4
 OECD (2009), p. 11. See also Malinauskaite (2012) according to whom an economic crisis is a “golden 
era” for rescue mergers, p. 308.  
5
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, Official Journal L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1–22 (hereafter Merger Regulation).  
2 
 
transactions that might be harmful to economic efficiency and consumer welfare are 
prohibited.
6
 However, the overwhelming majority of mergers are considered to be 
unproblematic and they are therefore cleared by the Commission.
7
  
The failing firm defence brings an exception to the underlying logic of merger control, as 
mergers that have anti-competitive effects can be cleared on the basis of the defence. The 
logic behind this, according to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the European 
Commission, is that “the deterioration of the competitive structure that follows the merger 
cannot be said to be caused by the merger”.8 Therefore, in situations where competition is 
going to deteriorate regardless of the merger, the transaction should not be held responsible 
for the “significant impediment to effective competition”.9 In other words, although anti-
competitive effects are to follow the merger, they would also occur in the absence of 
transaction, which is why the approval of the defence is compatible with the substantive 
test of EU merger control. 
The first case in which the European Commission accepted a merger on the basis of the 
failing firm defence was Kali and Salz
10
 in late 1993 – a decision which the Court of 
Justice (ECJ) subsequently confirmed to be correct.
11 
 The failing firm doctrine was further 
developed by the Commission’s decision in BASF/Pantochim/Eurodiol12 and it is now 
codified in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
13
 However, after these cases the 
Commission was reluctant to approve the defence although some merging parties did try to 
persuade it to do so. This led some commentators to believe that the criteria set up for the 
approval of the defence was too demanding and should be eased at least during the 
economic downturn in order to avoid bankruptcies.
14
 The Commission replied to these 
comments by stating that it will not loosen its interpretation of the existing rules during the 
                                                          
6
 In this thesis “merger” is applied as a broader concept covering also “acquisitions” although the two are 
differentiated when seen appropriate. The Merger Regulation refers to mergers as “concentrations” and the 
term covers both mergers and acquisitions regardless of the means of the transaction as explained in Article 
3(1) of the Merger Regulation. 
7
 In fact, in general mergers are seen to benefit the efficiency and competitiveness of firms. See e.g. Recital 4 
of the Merger Regulation. 
8
 Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings, Official Journal C 031, 5.2.2004, p. 5–18 (hereafter Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines), para. 89. 
9
 See e.g. Bouckaert & Kort (2014), p. 436–437. 
10
 Case IV/M.308 Kali+Salz/MDK/Treuhaund, Commission Decision of 14 December 1993. 
11
 I.e. the failing firm defence was compatible with EU merger control rules. Judgment of the ECJ in joined 
Cases C-68/94 and C-30/95, France and others v Commission, EU:C:1998:148. 
12
 Case M.2314 BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, Commission Decision of 11 July 2001. 
13
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, paras. 89–91. 
14
 E.g. Malinauskaite (2012), p. 308; Kokkoris (2014), p. 44. 
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crisis and that the current Merger Regulation offers enough flexibility to take into account 
the evolving market conditions.
15
 
However, in 2013 the Commission cleared two acquisitions, Nynas/Shell
16
 and 
Aegean/Olympic II
17
, on the basis of the failing firm defence. These clearances raised the 
question whether the Commission had become more lenient in its approach in order to 
avoid bankruptcies, and the negative social impacts resulting from them. The initial 
assessments, however, seemed to suggest otherwise as the two cases were estimated 
fulfilling the demanding criteria that the Commission had previously set for accepting the 
defence.
18
 
1.2. Purpose of the Research  
This thesis takes a closer look at the development of the failing firm defence in EU merger 
control. By looking at how the European Commission has responded to mergers where the 
failing firm defence has been invoked the aim here is to clarify the failing firm doctrine 
applied by the Commission.  
As already mentioned, after a long period of time, during the recent economic crisis, the 
European Commission came to accept two mergers on the basis of this defence. Hence, it 
shall be assessed how these latest cases have affected the failing firm defence doctrine 
established by the Commission in its previous decisions.
19
 It is of particular interest to find 
out whether the Commission has been able to maintain its earlier interpretation of the 
merger control rules during the economic crisis, or have the new cases introduced changes 
to the assessment of the failing firm defence possibly in the form of leniency as demanded 
by some critics. As the both 2013 cases included elements of the failing division defence, 
on the basis of which the Commission has not previously accepted mergers, the purpose of 
this thesis is also to assess whether the European Commission’s application of the failing 
division defence has changed and become more lenient.   
                                                          
15
 European Commission website, Tackling the financial crisis, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/recovery/financial_sector.html.  
16
 Case M.6360 Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery, Commission Decision of 2 September 2013. 
17
 Case M.6796 Aegean/Olympic II, Commission Decision of 9 October 2013. 
18
 E.g. Pouncey et al. (2014), p. 25; Perpiñà (2015), p. 104. See also Komninos & Jeram (2014) according to 
whom the approval of these cases during such a short period of time was more likely to be a coincidence than 
a reflection of the Commission’s changed interpretation of the defence, p. 613. 
19
 However, in order to recognise the possible changes brought by the Commission’s recent decisional 
practice, it is essential to look at the development of the failing firm defence in EU merger control in its 
entirety.   
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It has been suggested that EU competition law is not serving a purpose of its own but 
should rather be understood as a tool that is used to accomplish other goals of European 
Union such as market integration.
20
 Moreover, industrial policy considerations are said to 
have at times gained the upper hand over EU competition law goals.
21
 Against this 
background, would it not be possible for the European Commission to take into 
consideration the grim economic development of some Member States and allow this to 
affect its decision when assessing mergers and the approval of failing firm defence? 
Therefore I intend to estimate whether the European Commission has taken other factors 
besides competition – such as the negative impacts of the economic crisis or the furthering 
of industrial policy – into account in its decisions regarding the failing firm defence.  
The approval of Nynas/Shell and Aegean/Olympic II doubled the amount of mergers that 
the European Commission has accepted on basis of the failing firm defence. Hence, there 
is reason to believe that these clearances also offer insights on questions concerning the 
interpretation of the failing firm defence that competition law scholars have been 
speculating about after Kali and Salz and BASF/Pantochim/Eurodiol decisions. One of the 
major academic debates has regarded the question whether it is necessary, in order for the 
European Commission to approve a concentration on the basis of the failing firm defence, 
to fulfil the formal failing firm criteria, i.e. the criteria now listed in paragraph 90 of the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
22
 It has been suggested that the Commission might be 
willing to clear a merger solely on the basis of a lack of causality between the merger and 
the deterioration of competition, as the concentration is not seen to cause more harm to 
competition than its prohibition would.
23
  
On a more general level, I wish to look at the development of the European Commission’s 
merger control practice including its approach towards the failing firm defence in 
comparison with theoretical underpinnings concerning competition law, merger control, 
and the failing firm defence. Has the Commission been eager to amend its approach along 
                                                          
20
 See e.g. Ma (2014), p. 94–95. The competition law provisions of the European Community were originally 
designed to further market integration by eradicating trade barriers between the Member States. Geradin et al. 
(2012), p. 16. 
21
 Commission decisions have not always been based purely on the competiveness of the markets but rather 
on the survival of European companies against their global competitors. See e.g. Geradin & Girgenson 
(2012). 
22
 “First, the allegedly failing firm would in the near future be forced out of the market because of financial 
difficulties if not taken over by another undertaking. Second, there is no less anti-competitive alternative 
purchase than the notified merger. Third, in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would 
inevitably exit the market”. 
23
 See Oinonen (2013). 
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with the development of economic theories or has there been a single dominant theory that 
has been followed throughout the years?  
1.3. Concerning Theory, Method and Material 
The research questions posed above cover a somewhat broad spectrum of topics varying 
from specific changes introduced lately in the midst of the current crisis to overall 
assessments concerning the development of EU merger control. Hence, I believe that 
answering these questions requires a broad approach. Methodological pluralism is no 
oddity in legal research.
24
 In fact, it could be suggested that a combination of approaches 
offers a comprehensive look at the development of the failing firm defence in EU merger 
control.  
However, the underlying approach is set upon a firm basis of law and economics as is 
common in competition law.
25
 Economic theories will form the theoretical framework that 
is applied in order to assess the logic, consistency and successfulness of EU merger 
control. This is necessary as in the assessment of competition law cases legal deliberation 
is affected by economic analysis of the circumstances regarding competition in the 
situation in question.
26
 In order to understand the economic reasoning used by the 
European Commission in its decisions concerning the failing firm defence, it is essential to 
grasp at least the basics of economic theory concerning merger control. As Seitz points out, 
the terminology of competition law includes a range of concepts that have their origin in 
economics. These terms are vital in understanding the framework consisting of competition 
law provisions and cases.
27
  
A major purpose of this research is to clarify how the European Commission currently 
assesses the failing firm defence. As we are defining the legislation in force we are dealing 
with doctrinal research. According to Hirvonen, in addition to defining the contents of 
legal provisions in force, doctrinal research sets forth statements concerning the 
interpretation of these provisions and strives to improve our comprehension of them.
28
 This 
research intends to clarify how the latest cases have contributed to the assessment of the 
                                                          
24
 Hirvonen (2011), p. 9. 
25
 The use of economic analysis in legal research increased in the 1960’s as it expanded to more traditional 
areas of law but economics was applied in competition law even before this. Posner (2003), p. 23. 
26
 Ojala (2011), p. 10. 
27
 Seitz (2014), p. 368. 
28
 Hirvonen (2011), p. 22, 34. 
6 
 
failing firm defence in the merger control practiced by the European Commission. The aim 
is to present new findings concerning this particular area of law.
29
  
It should be noted that doctrinal research is increasingly expected to use pluralist 
methodology as legal provisions are recognised to be connected to social, economic, and 
cultural surroundings.
30
 This research includes a comparative law element, as the 
development and interpretation of the failing firm defence in the EU is at times compared 
to the development in the United States, where the failing firm defence had its origins. 
Similarly, the fact that the historic development of EU merger control and the failing firm 
doctrine is included means that there is also a degree of legal historical perspective to the 
research.
31
  
Doctrinal research is generally carried out by collecting and analysing the relevant case 
law and legislation which are regarded as primary sources.
32
 This is also the case with this 
research although the most important primary sources consist of the decisions of the 
European Commission in merger cases. Case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union concerning EU merger control rules is also included. The Merger Regulation and 
the competition law articles in the Treaty for the Functioning of The European Union
33
 
(TFEU) contain the most important legal provisions but in EU competition law the failing 
firm defence is dealt within the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which demonstrates that 
non-regulatory instruments will also play a role as primary sources in this research. The 
secondary sources primarily consist of competition law handbooks, journal articles dealing 
with the failing firm defence, and case commentaries concerning the merger decisions of 
the European Commission. 
1.4. Structure of the Research 
This thesis consists of five chapters. After the introduction (Chapter 1), we shall turn our 
attention towards the economic theories that are related to competition law and merger 
control. The objective of Chapter 2 is to give a general impression of the theories that have 
                                                          
29
 Hirvonen (2011), p. 18; Häyhä (1997), p. 19. 
30
 Hirvonen (2011), p. 55. 
31
 According to Kangas (1997), this inclusion is necessary when dealing with doctrinal research as he argues 
that when interpreting the legislation in force, the research would not be complete without a historical 
perspective, p. 92. 
32
 Dobinson & Johns (2007), p. 19. 
33
 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal C 326/49, 
26.10.2012, p. 47–390 (hereafter TFEU). 
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been – and still are – influencing competition law systems including merger control 
practices. The idea is to ensure that the reader becomes familiar with competition law 
terminology and is offered the necessary background information that is required for 
understanding the reasoning of the European Commission in its decisions regarding the 
failing firm defence. The theories are also used to assess the Commission’s approach 
towards the defence and merger control in general. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the merger control practice of the European Union. A historic look at 
the development and an outline of the goals of EU merger control shall be presented. These 
sections are relevant for establishing how social and economic realities have shaped EU 
merger control in the past, and for evaluating the readiness of the Commission to take into 
account other factors besides competition including the economic crisis. Chapter 3 also 
offers a general representation of the procedure and substantive appraisal of concentrations 
under the Merger Regulation. Both of these sections are necessary in order to understand 
the detailed analysis in the Commission’s decisions concerning the failing firm defence 
discussed in the final chapters. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the development of the failing firm defence in EU merger control. 
This begins with a look at the origins of the defence in the United States and the following 
academic debate concerning its correct application. After this a thorough study of the 
different decisions adopted by the Commission regarding the failing firm defence – both 
before and after the economic crisis – shall be presented. This development is analysed by 
the tools gathered in Chapter 2 and reflected against the merger control practice of the 
European Commission discussed in Chapter 3. Finally, in Chapter 5 the central findings of 
this thesis are summarised.  
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2. Economic Theories concerning Competition 
As already noted above competition law includes the use of a number of economic 
concepts. The close relationship with economics requires us to take a closer look behind 
the theories used in competition law and competition policy so that we are able to 
understand the reasoning behind competition law provisions and their application 
discussed in the following Chapters. Moreover, the theories are used to assess the 
Commission’s approach towards the failing firm defence as well as merger control in 
general. The economic theories commonly associated with competition are presented here 
by using competition law literature.
34
 
The role of economics in competition law has grown stronger over time. When antitrust 
legislation was originally drafted in the United States the approach was more legalistic.  
However, there economic thinking started to influence competition law from the 1950’s 
onwards while in Europe this did not largely take place until the 1990’s.35 During the last 
decades this influence has been the more visible than ever before in competition law 
enforcement.
36
 
2.1.Neoclassical Economics and Market Structures Models 
Neoclassical economics is the prevailing school of thought in economics.
37
 This is also 
evident in the field of competition law, which is heavily influenced by neoclassical 
thinking and its market structure models. The reason why this might be is the ability of 
these models to express the effects of competition (or lack of it) on social welfare. 
However, these models are not well-suited to describe actual existing market conditions, 
and they are unable to produce clear policy recommendations or instructions on when 
competition authorities should intervene in the market.
38
 Nevertheless, they are valuable in 
explaining the effects competition has in the markets, but their apparent simplicity should 
be kept in mind.  
 
 
                                                          
34
 It should be noted that many of the economic concepts and theories introduced here were originated in the 
field of economics. However, given the scope of this research, competition law literature is considered to 
offer sufficient depth as source material while introducing these theories.  
35
 This Chapter is not dealing with EU law but competition law in general. However, occasional references to 
relevant rules concerning EU competition law and merger control are made when seen necessary. 
36
 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 2; Geradin et al. (2012), p.  60. 
37
 See e.g. Ojala (2011), p. 10. 
38
 Greadin et al. (2012), p. 62, 69. 
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2.1.1. Companies have varying degrees of Market Power  
Our study of neoclassical economics begins with market power, which is not a market 
structure, but it is central in understanding the models of perfect competition, monopoly, 
and oligopoly as well as competition law in general. 
Market power is usually defined as the power to raise price above the competitive level.
39
 
This competitive price level is also known as marginal cost, which describes the cost of 
producing the last unit of output (including a sufficient profit margin).
40
 According to 
neoclassical economic theory’s model of perfect competition, market price should equal 
marginal cost.
41
 However, when a company possesses market power, it can lift prices 
above its marginal cost, e.g. by cutting down production, and in this way obtain monopoly 
profits.
42
  
When a company exercises market power, a welfare loss occurs: not all of those who are 
willing to buy the product can obtain it.
43
 In addition, the ones who are able to buy the 
product have to pay a higher price than they would if the market was competitive. From 
the point of view of economic theory, this leads to suboptimal or inefficient allocation of 
resources in the economy. Abusive market power does not only harm consumers in the 
form of higher prices and scarcity of products. It can also stall innovation and reduce the 
quality and the variety of products.
44
 In other words, the resources that should be in the use 
of consumers or invested in research and development are transferred to the producer in the 
form of monopoly profits. 
In reality, neither perfect competition nor total monopoly describe the actual market 
conditions. Companies have different degrees of market power, and it should be noted that 
its possession in itself is not harmful. Market power is usually obtained legitimately by 
providing consumers better products at a lower price than competitors: companies often 
gain market power while increasing consumer welfare. This is why competition policy 
does not prohibit companies from gaining market power but is focused on how market 
power is obtained, maintained, increased, and exercised. Market power becomes 
                                                          
39
 See e.g. Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 10. 
40
 Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 13; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 5.  
41
 Companies produce more products as long as it is still profitable for them. As the supply of products 
increases their price will decrease until it equals marginal cost. Geradin et al. (2014), however note that 
companies never actually calculate their marginal cost, p. 97. 
42
 Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 10, 14.  
43
 Ibid. p. 57. 
44
 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 1–2; Geradin et al. (2012), p. 79–80. 
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problematic from the point of view of competition law only when a company possess a 
significant degree of it and exercises it abusively by bringing anti-competitive effects on 
the market and harm to consumer welfare.
45
  As mentioned in the introduction, merger 
control acts as a type of ex ante control to avoid this abuse. In merger control the key 
concern is the degree of market power a company will acquire through a merger.
46
 
2.1.2. Perfect Competition as an Ideal Market Structure 
The study of neoclassical economic theory often begins with the concept of perfect 
competition, which describes an ideal market structure in terms of competitiveness of the 
market. In order for a market structure to resemble perfect competition, specific conditions 
must exist. Perhaps the most relevant factor is the number of suppliers and buyers 
operating in the market. When a sufficient number of actors operate the market, none of 
them is able to lift or reduce the market price on their own. When there are enough 
suppliers from whom the consumer can choose products from, each supplier’s output is so 
small, when compared to the total output on the market, that their decisions regarding the 
level of production cannot affect the market price. This, however, would not be the case 
without the other conditions of perfect competition in place. These conditions include the 
nonexistence of entry barriers (anyone can become a supplier, i.e. substantial resources are 
not needed), the homogeneity of products (the characteristics of the product do not vary 
between different suppliers), and full transparency (the consumers have the same 
knowledge about the market as the producers do).
47
 Understandably, these are demanding 
conditions for a market to contain and perfect competition does not actually exist on any 
market. 
According to neoclassical economic theory, perfect competition benefits consumers who 
are offered a wider selection of better products with lower prices and greater efficiency. 
Perfect competition is perceived to maximize consumer welfare and social welfare – which 
in neoclassical terms is understood as productive and allocative efficiency.
48
 
Productive efficiency refers to the costs of producing goods and services, which are the 
lowest possible under perfect competition. This benefits the whole society as its wealth is 
                                                          
45
 E.g. Article 102 of the TFEU lists unfair pricing practices, limitation of production or technical 
development as forms of this abuse. 
46
 Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 56; Geradin et al. (2012), p. 78–79. 
47
 Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 20. 
48
 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 4. 
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expended the minimum amount in the production process.
49
 Productive efficiency contains 
a Darwinian view of the market as survival of the fittest: if a firm is less efficient it will 
exit the market and an efficient entrant will take its place.
50
 Companies compete to become 
more efficient than their competitors in order to reduce prices and get more customers. 
Equilibrium will form where price and marginal cost of production intersect.
51
 In terms of 
merger control a merger will generate productive efficiencies if the newly formed entity is 
able to lower its production costs more than the companies can do separately.
52
 
Allocative efficiency refers to an ideal provision of economic resources directed at the 
market. Under perfect competition the allocation cannot be changed to make anyone better 
off without making someone else worse off. Resources are allocated perfectly as 
consumers are able to obtain the goods and services they wish at the price they are willing 
to pay. If the aggregate output would be smaller, not all of those who are willing could buy 
the product.  On the other hand, if production rises, the price received from the product 
would be lower than the cost of its production.
53
 In this case the producers would be 
spending more resources in this market than is efficient, while these resources could be 
used to satisfy consumer needs on other markets. The right output in the market leads to 
market price equalling marginal cost. Allocative efficiency is achieved because rational 
producers will expand production until it is no longer profitable, that is until the production 
of an extra unit will not earn them more than its production costs. In economic terms, the 
production will not be increased to a point in which the marginal cost would exceed 
marginal revenue.
54
 
In addition to productive and allocative efficiency, perfect competition is claimed to have a 
dynamic effect on innovation as well as technological research and development as 
companies strive to come up with better products than their competitors. This effect is 
called dynamic efficiency, which is not, however, as clearly captured by neoclassical 
economic model of perfect competition.
55
 Although, in general, it is believed that 
innovation should be taken into consideration while assessing mergers – as increases in 
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 Whish & Bailey (2012, p. 5. 
50
 Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 21. 
51
 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 5. 
52
 Ma (2014), p. 123. 
53
 See supra note 41. 
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 See e.g. Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 4–6; Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 21. 
55
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economic welfare often result from innovations – it is unclear how competition law should 
be enforced in order to promote dynamic efficiencies.
56
  
The different types of efficiencies are not always consistent with one another. For example 
mergers can produce productive efficiencies by lowering production costs at the expense of 
allocative efficiency if deadweight loss occurs through a more monopolistic market 
structure.
57
 And, although allocative efficiency should produce optimal prices for 
consumers, it might stall innovation, i.e. dynamic efficiency, thus making the consumers 
worse off in the long run.
58
 
As already discussed, perfect competition does not occur in reality, and the critics of 
neoclassical economics believe that it would be more fruitful for economic theory to focus 
on market structures that actually exist. Additionally, the theory is said to neglect, among 
other things, consumer loyalty (a price increase will not be automatically followed by a 
loss of customers, who do not have information about cheaper substitutes) and the fact that 
not all producers are rationally maximising their profits.
59
  
2.1.3. Monopoly, Oligopoly and Limited Competition 
Another model used in neoclassical economic theory to describe the effects of market 
structure on competition is monopoly. In a monopoly only one producer is operating on the 
market. Hence it can reduce its output and increase prices and maximise its profits without 
the fear of losing customers to competitors. If the producer is rational, as neoclassical 
theory expects it to be, this is exactly what happens when a monopolistic market structure 
exists.
60
 
Although a monopolistic market structure increases the welfare of the producer, the 
welfare of consumers and the society as a whole decreases. Not all consumers are able to 
obtain the products they need and would get under perfect competition, as the market price 
is well above marginal cost. This leads to allocative inefficiency called the deadweight 
loss. Wealth is transferred from consumers to the producer, and the economy is performing 
under its full potential.
61
 In addition, in a monopolistic market structure the producer’s 
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 Ma (2014), p. 124–127; Peeperkorn & Verouden (2014), p. 37. See also infra note 62 on the debate on 
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57
 For “deadweight loss”, see section 2.1.3. 
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production costs may increase, as it has no incentive to control its costs in order to be more 
efficient than its competitors which leads to productive inefficiency. There are differing 
views concerning monopolies and dynamic efficiency.
62
 
Since a monopoly has negative impacts on society’s economic performance, it is not a 
desired outcome in competition policy. Additionally, consumer welfare is often a key goal 
in competition policy. Therefore, when evaluating whether a merger should be approved an 
outcome that would lead to a loss of consumer welfare is usually out of the question.
63
  
However, the creation of monopolistic market structures is not a common dilemma and 
merger control is more focused on companies acquiring or strengthening their market 
power.
64
 A more central market structure in terms of this is oligopoly, which describes a 
market that is operated only by few suppliers. None of the producers are in a position of a 
monopolist that could individually decide the level of output on the market and set the 
market price to a level that benefits it the most. But the market is not operating under the 
conditions of perfect competition either, where suppliers would not have any influence on 
the level of output or the market price.  
It is difficult to analyse this influence, but competition policy should pay attention to this, 
since anti-competitive outcomes often arise from oligopolies. In the case of mergers, these 
issues are likely to arise in the form of coordinated effects discussed in detail later on.
65
 
The European Commission has been cautious and challenged mergers if there is a 
likelihood of coordinated effects in a market that contains only two or three large 
companies.
66
 Oligopolies are particularly relevant in terms of this research, as failing firm 
arguments are typically presented in relation to mergers, which take place in markets that 
have a limited number of competitors. 
2.2.Modern Schools of Competition Law 
Even though neoclassical economic theory has proven useful in illustrating the effects that 
different market structures have on competition, it has not been developed from the 
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perspective of competition law. As perfect competition or monopolies do not occur in 
reality the application of these models is challenging in competition law enforcement. The 
following sections introduce schools of thought that have developed mostly during the 
latter part of the 20
th
 century in order to correct this shortcoming. The analysis of 
competition law cases today is largely affected by the thinking developed in these 
schools.
67
 It is of particular interest in this research to find out which schools of thought 
have had an influence on the European Commission’s interpretation of the failing firm 
defence and merger control in general. 
2.2.1. Harvard School and Market Concentration 
The first wave of modern theory concentrating purely on competition policy was originated 
by a few scholars from Harvard University during the 1940’s and 1950’s.68 Harvard 
School is the term used when their thinking and contribution to competition law is being 
referred to. 
The main contribution of Harvard School is known as Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-
C-P) paradigm. According to this paradigm, the market performance of companies is 
determined by their market behaviour which in turn is determined by the market structure – 
that is, the number of suppliers and buyers operating on the market.
69
 Harvard School 
stressed especially the significance of market structure in determining the final outcome in 
the markets.
70
  
The data gathered by Harvard School scholars suggested that concentrated markets – i.e. 
markets operated only by few major companies – that had entry barriers, showed above 
average profitability. The policy recommendation of Harvard School for competition 
authorities was to concentrate on the market structure, in order to avoid large companies 
from profiting at the expense of consumers.
71
  Mergers affecting the market structure 
should be monitored and transactions leading to overly concentrated markets or the 
formation of entry barriers should be prohibited.
72
 These recommendations had 
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considerable influence in US merger control.
73
 However, Harvard School was even more 
interested in controlling companies already operating on concentrated markets.
74
 
Another way of understanding Harvard School thinking is to interpret that the protection of 
competitors, instead of the competition process, should be the focus of antitrust 
enforcement. Even nowadays, it is not uncommon to hear opinions calling for stronger 
protection of small companies against the actions of their larger competitors.
75
 The idea is 
that competition law should level the playing field so that everyone would have equal 
opportunities to compete.
76
 It has been argued, that competitors rather than competition has 
been protected by the European Commission in some of its decisions.
77
  
Although the S-C-P paradigm is not used anymore as an explanatory model, its influence is 
still visible. Market structure continues to be the starting point in the analysis of 
competition law cases. In merger cases market concentration can be used to estimate how 
likely anti-competitive behaviour would be after the merger.
78
 However, today deducing 
competition concerns solely on the basis of market structure is not considered to be 
sufficient. The actual behaviour of companies in this market must also be anti-competitive. 
Additionally, the relationship of structure, conduct and performance is believed to be more 
interactive: it is recognized that market conduct and performance also affect the market 
structure.
79
  
2.2.2. Chicago School and Economic Efficiencies 
The source of Harvard School criticism, which eventually led to the loss of its influence, 
can be located to another American university.  During the 1960’s and the 1970’s scholars 
from the University of Chicago presented their views on competition law according to 
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which there was no need to concentrate on markets that were becoming concentrated.
80
 
Their focus was on economic efficiency, which they believed should be promoted, when 
evaluating mergers and conducting competition policy in general.
81
  
Chicago School saw efficiency as a key factor in the promotion of social welfare and 
argued that it should be placed above considerations over distribution of wealth between 
producers and consumers.
82
 On the other hand, protection of competitors as proposed by 
Harvard School was interpreted to harm consumers and social welfare: markets should be 
let take care of themselves through the logic of survival of the fittest, so that the most 
efficient firms would prevail while the weakest companies would exit the market.
83
 
Chicago School associates this logic with allocative efficiency: resources and products are 
allocated to those who value them the most even if this leads to market structures where 
firms have significant market power.
84
 Higher concentration levels on the markets are not 
problematic and no public intervention is needed as long as they result in higher numbers 
of efficient firms.
85
 If this thinking is taken to the extreme and other aims of competition 
policy – such as consumer welfare – are disregarded, even mergers creating monopolies 
could be accepted, if the price increases following the reduction of output of the merged 
entity are lower than the cost savings and other efficiencies that follow from the merger.
86
 
Chicago School believed that Harvard school had condemned market concentration 
without establishing that it would always lead to anti-competitive behaviour. By doing so 
Harvard School had also overlooked the efficiencies that result from mergers that lead to 
more concentrated markets.
87
 According to Chicago School, larger companies tend to be 
more efficient and therefore able to sell better products to consumers at cheaper prices 
while making more profit than smaller firms. To Chicago School this was not an indication 
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of unreasonable market power but of greater efficiency. Even if the firms would be able to 
make larger profits while growing, monopoly profits should not occur or at least they 
would not be durable since entry barriers are usually low.
88
 
Chicago School argued that efficiencies should not merely be taken into account in merger 
control, but rather they should be a central goal of it.
89
  On the other hand, competition 
authorities should not concern themselves with market structures. Public intervention 
should be limited to cases of collusive behaviour which cannot be justified on the basis of 
efficiencies. The need to intervene should not arise outside concentrated, or oligopolistic, 
markets. However, unlike Harvard School suggested market structure alone cannot be the 
basis for intervention since efficiencies benefitting the whole society can occur also in 
oligopolistic markets if entry and exit barriers are low.
90
  
In addition, competition authorities should not intervene on the basis of the size of the 
firm.
91
 According to the minimalist competition policy of Chicago School intervention 
should only take place if anti-competitive behaviour on concentrated markets occurs. US 
competition law enforcement adopted this approach during the 1970’s and especially 
during the 1980’s.92 Efficiencies did not, however, become truly influential even in US 
merger control until the 1980’s when the efficiency defence was established as a formal 
doctrine and the emphasis of the analysis was shifted away from market concentration.
93
 
2.2.3. Contestable Markets and Exit from the Market 
The theory of contestable markets was developed during the 1980’s and was clearly 
influenced by the prevailing Chicago School thinking.
94
 According to this theory, optimal 
allocation of resources takes place if it is possible for firms to enter markets without 
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suffering costs that they cannot get back and exit the market without suffering losses. In 
other words, entry and exit from the market should be costless.
95
  
This is taking the idea of low entry barriers a step further while considering also exit 
barriers, which is important while discussing the failing firm defence. Free market 
economies need entrepreneurs to invest assets in new businesses and to enter new markets. 
Competition authorities are quick to judge barriers on entry and expansion, but according 
to economists it should be just as important to keep watch for exit barriers if the investment 
proves to be unprofitable. If exiting the market is not easy, it is likely that there is less 
enthusiasm towards entering risky markets.
96
  
Similarly to Chicago School’s theories concerning efficient oligopolistic markets, 
contestable markets could be economically efficient with only a few or even a single 
producer. Competition authorities and consumers do not have to worry about anti-
competitive behaviour in such markets, as new entrants can emerge if the producers 
increase prices and start receiving monopoly profits. The absence of entry may be regarded 
as a sign of a modest profit margin. In fact, in perfectly contestable markets the market 
price would actually equal marginal cost similarly as in the case of perfect competition.
97
  
The term minimum efficient scale is related to this. In some markets the market share of 
any company has to be very sizeable in order for the firm to be profitable, i.e. the minimum 
efficient scale is very large in relation to aggregate output. Some markets might even 
require that the production is in the hands of a single producer, i.e. a monopolist.  While 
the theory of contestable markets suggests that this would not cause problems as new 
entrants can emerge, Whish and Bailey are more cautious: when monopoly is the natural 
market condition, public ownership or additional regulation should be considered.
98
   
2.2.4. Freiburg School and Ordoliberalism 
Neoclassical economic theory, Harvard School and Chicago School are commonly credited 
as the leading schools of thought that have influenced competition law and merger control 
in the Western hemisphere. But when dealing with EU competition law, the intellectual 
                                                          
95
 Baumol (1982), p. 3–4, 14; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 17. 
96
 Baumol (1982), p. 4; Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 815. 
97
 Companies operating on contestable markets must also be efficient as inefficiency is a similar “invitation” 
to entry as abnormal profits. Also similarly to perfect competition perfectly ‘contestable markets’ do not 
occur in reality. Baumol (1982), p. 2–5, 14. 
98
 Whish & Bailey (2012), p. 10. 
19 
 
tradition developed in the University of Freiburg during the 1930’s, known as 
ordoliberalism, should also be taken into account.  
Ordoliberalism originated to counter ultraliberalism that was the prevailing dogma in early 
20
th
 century Germany. According to ultraliberalism, the state should not intervene to the 
relationships of economic agents under any circumstances. This policy led to a situation 
where in 1933, at the end of the Weimar Republic, some 4000 cartels were active in 
Germany. As the social and economic crisis developed in Germany in the beginning of the 
1930’s, a group of scholars from the University of Freiburg believed that it resulted from 
the abuse of private economic power, and that this power should be contained by a well-
functioning legal system. They deduced that competition does not always occur 
spontaneously, and that government intervention is needed to establish and to promote it. 
Competition legislation was needed to stop companies from colluding with each other and 
eliminating competition by acquiring dominant positions in the markets.
99
  
At the same time Freiburg School scholars believed that economic freedom was needed to 
secure political freedom. Economic freedom was threatened both by political and 
economic power as neither the government nor the market could be fully relied upon. 
Ordoliberalism wished to establish a middle way between liberal free-market economy and 
central planning, which would include state intervention but contain its abuse with the help 
of detailed regulation.
100
 
After World War II ordoliberalism was adopted in West Germany where it started to 
influence the relationship between the state and the economy, including national 
competition policy which became imbedded with social goals. As Germany had the longest 
tradition of practicing competition law these ideas became dominant when competition law 
was started to be drafted and enforced in the European Community. Liberalism and the 
idea of unrestricted competition have been relatively weak in Germany which might partly 
explain the differences between EU and US competition policies.
101
  
The goals of ordoliberal competition policy include both an economic and a political 
perspective. The main goal is perceived to be the freedom to compete. The economic 
perspective holds competition necessary for an efficient allocation of resources, whereas 
the political viewpoint favours increased private decision-making as a way to 
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counterbalance state power. These viewpoints are not seen to be contradicting with one 
another as they ultimately lead to a similar outcome where the economy is working well 
because of political goals. However, economic success is not equated with constant growth 
but instead with economic performance, which is dependent on such factors as equal 
opportunity for all and a fair distribution of wealth.
102
  
Another goal is complete competition where no firm is in a position from which it could 
pressure other companies or set prices on its own. Instead the price should be determined 
in the market much like in the model of perfect competition. But unlike perfect 
competition, complete competition is based on a political concern that deals with the 
distribution of power. These ideas are represented in EU competition law which focuses on 
the structure of the market and the degree of dominance held by companies.
103
 Protection 
of competitors has been noticeable especially in decisions adopted under Article 102 of the 
TFEU.
104
  
2.2.5. Theories of Competitive Harm and Competitive Constraints 
Merger control deals with the prediction of future events as it assesses the likely effects 
mergers will have on competition. According to modern understanding of competition law 
the decision to prohibit a merger must be based on a theory of competitive harm that 
explains why competition would be harmed if the transaction took place. In addition the 
authority must show how the competitive structure will be better without the merger.
105
  
Two theories of competitive harm are relevant from the point of view of horizontal 
mergers. First of all, competition can be harmed if the competitive constraints, which the 
merging firms have imposed upon each other, will disappear following the merger and the 
new entity is able to raise prices regardless of the behaviour of other firms in the market.
106
 
In the most simplistic form this would happen if a market is consisting of two companies 
fiercely competing with each other that are planning to merge. Without the merger, the two 
companies could not raise prices above the competitive level because of the competition 
they face from each other. But after the merger, the new entity would face no competition 
and could lift prices without any fear of losing its customers to competitors. This is known 
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as unilateral or non-coordinated effects. Non-coordinated effects can take place even if the 
newly merged entity is facing competition on the market as the competitors might find it 
beneficial to follow the decision to raise prices. 
According to another scenario, the market is operated by several producers, and the newly 
merged entity is able to coordinate its behaviour with them. This collective exercise of 
market power is known as coordinated effects.
107
 Coordinated effects can appear in 
oligopolistic markets where each operator independently recognises the benefits following 
from uncompetitive behaviour.
108
  
In both of the scenarios described above, the key concern is the ability to exercise market 
power following the disappearance of competitive constraints.
109
 Competitive constraints 
imposed by the competitors on each other guarantee that they cannot lift prices without 
losing customers. When these constraints are lost following a merger, price increases 
become profitable. Horizontal mergers are not nowadays prohibited because of the size of 
the companies involved. Instead prohibition follows if significant competitive constraints 
disappear, and the remaining competitors in the market are not able to exert strong enough 
competitive constraints on the merging party.
110
  
*** 
Each of the theories presented in this Chapter attempt to explain how competition law and 
merger control should be enforced. Their recommendations have been influenced by the 
political ideologies and economic environments that were in place during the development 
of these theories. However, none of the theories encourage competition authorities to 
change their application of merger control rules during an economic crisis. As we move on 
to look at the merger control practice of the EU it will be interesting to see how these 
theories have affected it during different times of its development. In the final Chapters of 
this research the influence of these theories on the failing firm doctrine of the European 
Commission – including its development during the recent economic crisis – shall be 
assessed.  
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3. Merger Control practice of the European Commission 
This Chapter concentrates on how the theories discussed above have affected EU merger 
control by looking into the main features of the European Commission’s merger control 
practice. This will include a look into the historical development of the merger control 
regime, a general outline of the goals intended to achieve by the screening of mergers, as 
well as an overview of the assessment procedure. The main emphasis, however, will be on 
the substantive assessment of mergers in order to clarify the factors that are assessed by the 
Commission when it decides whether or not a transaction can be approved. This will be 
highly relevant when discussing the appraisal of cases in which the failing firm defence has 
been invoked later on. 
3.1.Development of EU Merger Control 
We shall first turn to the historical development of merger control in the European Union. 
While discussing the events that have shaped the merger control regime the idea is also to 
introduce some key features of EU merger control that are still in place today.  
Modern competition law was originated in the United States when Sherman Act 
prohibiting cartels and monopolisation of markets was passed in 1890.
111
 Cartels and 
monopolies were a common phenomenon also in Europe already during the early 
1900’s.112  However, economic liberalism was so influential that it was commonly believed 
that the freedom of contract also justified contracts that restricted competition. Although 
the negative impacts following from this were identified, competition law was not 
effectively enforced in Europe during the first half of the 20
th
 century. The Great 
Depression and World War II also delayed the development of European competition law 
systems. It was only after the war when effective legislation banning cartels and the abuse 
of market power was enforced in Europe.
113
 The European Community had a major impact 
on this development.  
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3.1.1. Rome Treaty and Legal Basis for Merger Control 
The 1951 Treaty of Paris already included competition law provisions prohibiting cartels 
and the abuse of economic power in steel and coal sectors.
114
 The creation of the European 
Community through the Treaty of Rome in 1957 expanded the competition provisions to 
cover all sectors of economy.
115
 These provisions were designed to complement other 
Treaty provisions which aimed to eradicate barriers of trade between Member States.
116
 
An instrument designed specifically for the enforcement of these provisions was not 
adopted until Regulation 17/62.
117
 However, neither the Treaties nor Regulation 17/62 did 
include provisions on merger control. This followed at least partly from the objection of 
European companies who claimed that controlling their growth would harm their 
opportunities to compete with companies from the United States.
118
  
Nonetheless, the European Commission interpreted that Article 86 of the Rome Treaty 
(now Article 102 of the TFEU), concerning the abuse of dominant position, granted it a 
significant amount of control concerning acquisitions of companies in the internal market – 
although this control was often somewhat informal. In 1973 the ECJ confirmed in 
Continental Can
119
, that the Commission did have jurisdiction over acquisitions in the 
internal market on the basis of Article 86.
120
 The ruling gave the Commission more 
confidence and it continued to use the Article increasingly as its legal basis in assessing 
mergers during 1980’s.121 
The need for controlling large market transactions was discovered in the European 
Community around the time Harvard School was influential and recommended that the 
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authorities should pay attention to the structure of markets. This might have encouraged 
the Commission to interpret the Treaty provisions in a way that allowed it to do so. 
Article 85 (now Article 101 of the TFEU), prohibiting cartels and other agreements 
disrupting competition in the internal market, was believed not to apply to mergers until 
the ECJ’s ruling in Philip Morris.122  As a result, the Commission started using Article 85 
as another basis of jurisdiction for merger control.
123
 The uncertainties that followed from 
the Philip Morris judgment concerning the correct legal basis helped the Member States to 
become convinced of the need for a separate merger regulation.
124
  
This need was becoming increasingly evident during the 1980’s also because the number 
of transnational mergers started to increase. The European markets had become more 
integrated, as the Member States had intended, and European companies had grown strong 
enough to face global competition. If the internal markets were to concentrate further 
without any control, anti-competitive effects could have followed.
125
 Meanwhile some 
Member States were developing their own merger control systems, which – if left to the 
sole competence of the Member States – might have caused difficulties later on. All these 
developments paved the way for the Merger Regulation of 1989.
126
 
3.1.2. 1989 Merger Regulation and ‘One-Stop-Shop’ 
The Merger Regulation of 1989 was the first legal instrument that undoubtedly gave the 
European Commission jurisdiction over some of the mergers taking place in the internal 
market. From early on there has existed a division of labour between the Commission and 
national competition authorities (NCAs). The 1989 Regulation included the concept of 
one-stop-shop which has been an essential part of the EU merger control regime ever 
since. The purpose of one-stop-shop is to give the Commission exclusive competence to 
oversee mergers that possess a community dimension.
127
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The Commission has jurisdiction over a merger only if the concentration reaches one of the 
turnover thresholds defined in Article 1 of the current Merger Regulation.  The purpose of 
these thresholds is to provide a simple and an effective method for determining the 
competent authority. If a NCA and the Commission should disagree whether a 
concentration has a community dimension, the Commission has exclusive competence to 
decide about the matter.
128
 However, such disagreements do not often arise as Articles 1 
and 5(4) are fairly unambiguous about the turnover thresholds and the way in which the 
turnovers are calculated.   
The referral system between the NCAs and the Commission was further developed by the 
2004 Merger Regulation which has brought more flexibility to the question of 
jurisdiction.
129
 Both the Commission and a NCA can refer a concentration prior to its 
notification to each other under Articles 4(4) and 4(5) or after the notification has taken 
place under Articles 9 and 22.
130
 Furthermore the Commission and NCAs cooperate by 
assisting each other during the investigation of concentrations as stipulated by Article 19 
and Recital 40 of the Merger Regulation.  
3.1.3. 2004 Merger Regulation and SIEC test 
The 1989 Regulation was considered a success. It did, however, go through gradual 
amendments including the adaptation of the simplified procedure which allows a swift 
procedure in cases where concentrations are clearly not going to raise concerns.
131
   
Under the 1989 Regulation, the compatibility of a concentration with the internal market 
was assessed through the dominance test. According to this test, incompatibility with the 
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common market would follow if a concentration would “create or strengthen a dominant 
position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it”.132 
The problem with this test was its inability to deal with competitive harm that was not 
following from the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. As discussed above, 
competitive harm can follow from a merger either because of coordinated or non-
coordinated effects. The dominance test of the 1989 Regulation did take both of these 
effects into account but the focus on the creation or strengthening of a dominant possession 
left ‘a gap’ by excluding cases where non-coordinated effects would arise without the 
creation of a dominant position. This is particularly likely to happen in oligopolistic 
markets as in the case of Airtours.
133
  
As the Commission tried to deal with this matter under the 1989 Regulation, it decided to 
prohibit the takeover of First Choice by Airtours – which would have left only three 
competitors in the market – on the basis of a collective dominant position. According to the 
Commission, the firms would have been able to exercise market power without 
coordination.
134
 However, the General Court denied this interpretation stating that 
collective dominance occurs only in the case of coordinated effects.
135
 The problem was 
that the transaction was not causing coordinated but unilateral effects without the creation 
of a dominant position, which the dominance test was unable to cover.
136
 This was one of 
the main contributors to the decision to pass a new merger regulation in 2004.
137
 The major 
change brought by the current Merger Regulation was the introduction of the SIEC test that 
replaced the dominance test.
138
 This change helped to fill ‘the gap’ that was in the 
Commission’s powers in terms of being able to react to unilateral effects.139  
The current Article 2(3) still refers to the dominance test by stipulating that impediment of 
competition may take place in particular through the creation or strengthening of a 
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dominant position. This wording was chosen in order to preserve the decisional practice of 
the Commission and case law of Community Courts under the dominance test.
140
 Indeed, 
earlier case law is used in the appraisal of concentrations under the SIEC test. However, 
this should not be done without proper consideration. Dominance is no longer a necessary 
condition for a concentration to be found incompatible with the internal market and the 
absence of dominance does not guarantee its compatibility. The idea behind the new 
wording was clearly to widen the test of incompatibility which is now solely a matter of 
whether the concentration will impede effective competition regardless of dominance.
141
 
Compared to its earlier decisional practice the Commission has under the SIEC test been 
more focused on the loss of existing competition while the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position has been emphasised less.
142
  
The benefits of the SIEC test also include the fact that it is much closer to the substantive 
test used in the merger control system of the United States. The substantive assessment 
under the current Merger Regulation is more flexible and the Commission’s powers to 
intervene in merger cases have increased.
143
 The Commission has also become more 
tolerant towards efficiency gains that mergers may create.
144
 This is compatible with the 
effects-based approach whereas the practice under the dominance test represented a more 
formalistic approach.
145
 This amendment has received praises as the Commission has been 
more willing to perform broader analyses of the market dynamics related to the notified 
concentrations as opposed to relying purely on the static competitive harm theories.
146
 The 
downside is that the effects-based approach is also more complex and time-consuming as it 
requires substantial economic evidence.
147
 
The Commission has attempted to diminish uncertainties regarding its application of the 
Merger Regulation by offering various non-regulatory documents such as guidelines and 
notices.
148
 In the field of horizontal mergers, the Commission shed more light into its 
appraisal process by publishing the Horizontal Merger Guidelines which codified previous 
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decisional practice.
149
 The effects-based approach is an inherent feature of these 
Guidelines.
150
 Although the guidelines and notices are not legally binding instruments the 
parties to a concentration can rely upon them against the Commission itself.
151
  
3.2. Goals of EU Merger Control 
This section aims to present the goals that are intended to be achieved through EU merger 
control. The matter is by no means irrelevant. Companies, that are planning to merge, need 
to be aware of what the Commission is attempting to achieve in order to assess whether 
their merger will be cleared. Ambiguity regarding the goals of merger control will create 
uncertainty among European companies and stall their growth.
152
 In terms of this research, 
it is also necessary to understand the goals behind the merger control rules, as they are 
bound to affect the application of these rules – including the Commission’s approach to 
failing firm arguments. The goals of EU merger control also indicate which schools of 
thought introduced in Chapter 2 have had an impact on the Commission’s merger control 
practice. 
3.2.1. Preference of Consumer Welfare over Total Welfare 
In competition policy, consumer welfare refers to the level of benefits consumers extract 
from the competition process. The use of consumer welfare as a goal of competition policy 
has direct effects on merger control as concentrations that are harmful to consumers cannot 
be cleared even if this harm could be compensated by the benefits and efficiencies 
following from the transaction.
153
 In other words, when a concentration would enable the 
merging parties to save costs in production – and enable them to direct assets to different 
markets – but could deprive consumers from “low prices, high quality products, a wide 
selection of goods and services, and innovation” it cannot be approved.154  
The emphasis of consumer welfare as a goal of merger control is opposed by those who 
consider that the assessment of mergers should focus on total welfare, as all the benefits 
that the transaction generates should be taken into account regardless of who is benefitting 
from them. Therefore Chicago School scholars oppose consumer welfare as a goal of 
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merger control as it contradicts the objective of allocative efficiency.
155
 However, Chicago 
School has been criticised for sidelining the fact that companies might exaggerate the 
efficiency gains their transaction produces in which case mergers might decrease consumer 
welfare while not benefitting the society as a whole.
156
 
Whereas, according to the total welfare approach wealth transfers from consumers to 
producers are regarded as neutral, they cannot be accepted by the consumer welfare 
model.
157
 The choice between these two models has been clearly made in favour of 
consumer welfare in EU merger control. The importance of consumer welfare is expressed 
in Article 2(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation according to which the Commission, when 
assessing mergers shall take into account “the interests of the intermediate and ultimate 
consumers, and the development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to 
consumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition”. Possible efficiencies 
following from a merger must also benefit the consumers.
158
 The Commission, however, 
does not consider efficiencies and consumer welfare as contradictory concepts as 
according to it, competition “encourages enterprise and efficiency, creates a wider choice 
for consumers and helps reduce prices and improve quality”.159 
According to many estimates, consumer welfare is emphasised by the Commission 
increasingly.
160
 But others note that it has been central in EU competition law early on.
161
 
3.2.2. Tool for Market Integration? 
Market integration has been recognised as a goal of EU competition law ever since the 
ECJ’s decision in Continental Can where the Court concluded that the creation of a 
dominant position “could jeopardize the proper functioning of the Common market”.162 
The idea behind this goal is that the removal of trade barriers, which is achieved through 
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the transnational legislation of the EU, would be in vain if companies were allowed to 
divide the European markets into separate domestic sections.
163
 In order to prevent this 
from taking place, the merger control system should block measures that would isolate 
domestic markets from each other and clear cross-border transactions that generate more 
trade between the Member States.
164
 
Whereas consumer welfare is recognised as a legitimate goal of merger control in several 
competition law systems – including that of the United States – market integration is more 
of a unique feature of EU competition law. Some have estimated that market integration 
considerations have caused the Commission to prohibit behaviour that probably would 
have been accepted by other competition authorities assessing cases purely on economic 
grounds.
165
 What makes this problematic is the fact that market integration is partly in 
conflict with other, more legitimate, competition law goals such as economic efficiency 
and consumer welfare which might suffer because of this.
166
 
3.2.3. Ambiguous Role of Industrial Policy and Economic Efficiency 
When a merger decision has particular importance for a Member State – for instance when 
the creation of a national champion that is better equipped to compete in global markets is 
on the line – its government may try to persuade the Commission to take into account its 
national industry.
167
 Similarly, when a national company is threatened to be taken over by 
a foreign competitor, a Member State might be worried not only because of the loss of 
competition but also because of the loss of tax revenue.
168
  
EU competition policy and the European Commission’s decisions on mergers have at times 
been criticised for favouring European companies. The Commission’s objectivity might 
become blurred and interpretation of the rules more lenient, when it is dealing with an 
important European firm whereas in the case of e.g. American companies there is no such 
incentive. Industrial policy is clearly on the agenda of the Commission.
169
 But is it and 
should it be pursued through EU’s competition policy as well? 
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Geradin and Girgenson note that “industrial policy has always been present in European 
merger control even though its influence has decreased considerably following the 
adoption of the Merger Regulation” of 1989.170 For instance, in 
Mannesmann/Vallourec/Ilva
171
 the clearance of the concentration – which the Commission 
based on a somewhat questionable interpretation of the likelihood of entry on the market – 
was desirable form the point of view of industrial policy.
172
   
The European Commission, however, refuses to see competition and industrial policy 
contradictory to each other. Instead, the Commission believes that “competition within the 
EU helps make European companies stronger outside the EU too – and able to hold their 
own against global competitors”.173 The Commission argues that these two policies share 
similar goals – such as promotion of innovation and economic growth – but it has not 
explained how clashes between the two potentially conflicting policies would be 
resolved.
174
 
Some EU law scholars are not as optimistic. Van den Bergh and Camesasca believe that 
industrial policy and competition policy perceive the functioning of markets differently. 
Competition policy is focused on the allocation of resources, whereas industrial policy has 
an inherent need to intervene on the market which is why the two policies are likely to run 
into conflict.
175
 Others are not as worried as they note that there is little room for industrial 
policy considerations within the appraisal process of EU merger control. Moreover, the 
Commission does not possess powers to exempt concentrations that are incompatible with 
the internal market and its decisions are subject to judicial review.
176
  
However, in Aerospatiale
177
 – the first case in which the failing firm defence was invoked 
in EU merger control – industrial policy considerations were disregarded although the 
college of Commissioners was not unanimous about this when it blocked the merger. 
Nevertheless, Whish and Bailey believe that the case set a precedent as the concentration’s 
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compatibility with the common market was evaluated purely on the basis of the effect 
which it would have on competition.
178
 
In addition to the abovementioned goals, the European Commission’s merger control and 
its competition policy at large take into account other factors. Some believe that EU 
competition policy has in recent years witnessed an increase in its objectives, as a whole 
range of different social, political, and environmental goals have gained ground in EU 
law.
179
 This is also noted in the Merger Regulation as Recital 23 states that the 
Commission “must place its appraisal within the general framework of the achievement of 
the fundamental objectives” of the European Union. The influence of these objectives on 
e.g. EU merger control has been criticised.
180
 However, the effect of such fundamental 
objectives should not be exaggerated as they cannot be used to clear anti-competitive 
mergers and to circumvent Article 2(3) of the Merger Regulation. 
Nonetheless, EU competition policy and merger control have several goals – not all of 
which are completely compatible with each another. The emphasis placed on each 
objective changes over time and is affected by issues such as economic development.
181
 
Some have suggested that a hierarchy of goals could enhance legal certainty and 
consistency in the enforcement of these rules.
182
  
However, the goal, which is valued the most by the law and economics approach, seems to 
be less influential in EU merger control. The Commission has had a notoriously difficult 
relationship with the goal of economic efficiency. This is not to say that the Commission 
would disregard efficiency claims in its appraisal of concentrations.
183
 But whereas US 
merger control is considered to have developed hand in hand with economic theories 
concerning competition, the European Commission has been less enthusiastic about 
adopting new ideas which has become apparent in its attitude towards efficiency claims.
184
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Only after the current Merger Regulation came into force has the Commission’s attitude 
gradually changed more in line with theories supporting efficiencies. Nevertheless, it can 
be interpreted that the influence of Chicago School has not been as influential in EU as in 
US antitrust enforcement and merger control. 
3.3.Main features of the Procedure under the Merger Regulation 
The purpose of the following section is to shed light on the procedure under both the 
Merger Regulation as well as the Implementing Regulation.
185
 The objective is to illustrate 
how EU merger control works in practice. Understanding these procedural factors is also 
necessary when moving on to analyse the individual decisions of the European 
Commission concerning the failing firm defence. 
3.3.1. Standstill Obligation during the Examination of the Notification 
Merger control of the European Union is based on the premise that while in general 
corporate transactions have positive effects, they should be controlled in order to avoid 
permanent damage to competition in the internal market.
186
 To ensure that concentrations 
that may significantly impede efficient competition do not take place, Article 4(1) of the 
Merger Regulation stipulates that transactions with a community dimension must be 
notified to the European Commission before their implementation. This is complemented 
by the standstill obligation defined in Article 7(1) according to which a “concentration 
with a Community dimension… shall not be implemented either before its notification or 
until it has been declared compatible with the common market”.187 The Commission also 
possesses powers guaranteeing that these obligations are followed and that it receives the 
necessary information in order to assess the potential effects of the transaction.
188
  
However, in order to achieve the positive effects that market transactions produce – such 
as the improvement of economic efficiency, promotion of growth and enhancement of 
consumer welfare – merger control has to be proportionate in terms of its purpose.189 The 
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Merger Regulation aims to assure this by demanding the Commission to carry out its 
assessment without unnecessary delays.
190
  
Before even notifying the concentration, the parties usually contact the Commission in 
order to hear its preliminary informal estimation of the transaction.
191
 This is known as the 
pre-notification phase, during which the parties are already informed of potential concerns 
that the Commission might have. Given the tight time frame following the notification of 
the concentration, the pre-notification phase is recognized as an important step in enabling 
the procedure to go smoothly.
192
  
The examination period following the notification of the concentration is known as Phase 
I, during which the European Commission investigates whether the merger raises serious 
doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market. The Commission is under the 
obligation to collect sufficient amount of data in order to determine whether the transaction 
will significantly impede competition. Within the Commission, the Directorate-General for 
Competition handles the investigation. The sources of information include market reports 
and studies, annual reports of the parties, contents of the notification, and comments from 
third parties among other documents.
193
 The third parties include suppliers, competitors, 
and customers of the merging companies. Their opinions are compared to the arguments 
that the notifying parties have raised in their submissions or in the voluntary state of play 
meetings with the Commission.
194
 The gathered information is used to outline the market 
structure and its conditions.
195
 
The evidence used varies case by case as it depends on the characteristics of the market 
that is being examined.
196
 Because of the strict time limits of Phase I, in-depth econometric 
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analysis can often only take place during Phase II investigations.
197
 The need for 
sophisticated financial data is especially relevant when the Commission is faced with 
failing firm arguments, the appraisal of which always requires in-depth analysis.
198
  
3.3.2. Decision Regarding the Compatibility of the Merger 
In the majority of cases the number of competitors in the relevant market and the sizes of 
their market shares is enough to conclude whether competition concerns will arise.
199
 If the 
Commission comes to the conclusion that the concentration does not raise serious doubts it 
will be declared compatible with the common market.
200
 Even if competition concerns do 
arise the transaction can still often be cleared under Article 6(2) of the Merger Regulation 
as the parties offer sufficient remedies – modifications to the transaction guaranteeing  “the 
continuation of competition on the market” – that dissolve such concerns.201 Structural 
remedies, divestitures in particular, are preferred by the Commission because of their 
effectiveness and easy implementation. Commitments relating to the future behaviour of 
the merged entity are less easy to enforce.
202
 Around 5 per cent of concentrations notified 
to the Commission require modifications and are approved under remedies.
203
  
In a handful of cases competition concerns do arise and Phase II proceedings are initiated 
under Article 6(1)(c).
204
 A more in-depth investigation of the likely effects of the 
concentration will follow and it is concluded by a decision adopted by the College of 
Commissioners pursuant to Article 8 of the Merger Regulation. The purpose of this phase 
is to ensure a more thorough look at the concerns that arose during the Phase I 
investigation. The Commission is likely to acquire more extensive data and apply 
econometric techniques in its analysis.
205
 The parties may offer the Commission 
commitments at any point of the investigation in order to dissolve these concerns. If 
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competition concerns are assessed to be unlikely or if they are removed by the remedies 
offered by the parties, a clearance decision will follow.
206
  
If the Commission is likely to conclude that the concentration is incompatible with the 
common market, before issuing its decision it will send a Statement of Objection (SO) to 
the notifying parties where the doubts concerning the compatibility of the transaction are 
discussed. After this the parties can still try to persuade the Commission as they have the 
right to respond to the SO in writing as well as ask an oral hearing to be held.
207
 If the 
Commission does not change its mind, a decision prohibiting the merger in accordance to 
Article 8(3) shall be issued. This takes place extremely rarely. 
All decisions of the Commission are subject to judicial review exercised by the General 
Court – which acts as the court of first instance on competition matters – and ultimately by 
the Court of Justice if an appeal is made after the General Court’s judgment. The parties, as 
well as third parties who have an interest on the matter, have the right to appeal within two 
months of the decision.
208
 
3.4.Substantive Appraisal of Mergers 
In order for the European Commission to accept the failing firm arguments invoked by the 
merging parties and clear their transaction it must be compatible with Article 2(3) of the 
Merger Regulation. This is dependent on the Commission’s substantive appraisal of the 
merger. We shall now take a closer look at how the Commission assesses the harm a 
concentration might produce in the markets and subsequently decides whether the merger 
can be cleared. Understanding the logic of this appraisal process is crucial when discussing 
the Commission’s decisions relating to the failing firm defence. 
Although the possible anti-competitive effects arising from mergers usually have to be 
analysed case-by-case, the way in which these effects are identified is rather standardised. 
The Commission wishes to define two factors: the relevant market that is affected by the 
concentration, and the effect which the merger will have on the market structure and 
competition on this market. In particular, the Commission is interested in finding out 
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whether the concentration is able to increase prices in the relevant market independently or 
together with other firms.
209
 
3.4.1. Definition of the Relevant Market and Identification of Competitive Constraints 
The Commission’s assessment of a merger, case begins with the definition of the relevant 
market which the ECJ has confirmed to be “a necessary precondition for any assessment of 
the effect of a concentration on competition”.210 This includes the definition of both the 
relevant product market as well as the relevant geographical market.
211
 The idea is to 
identify the choices and substitutes available for the customers within the area in which the 
parties to a concentration are competing.
212
  
When a horizontal merger takes place, competition is always lost to some extent. Whether 
the deterioration of competition is significant depends on the competitive constraints that 
the merging parties are facing from each other and other competitors in the market. Market 
definition is needed to identify these competitive constraints.
213
 If the firms in question 
compete mainly against each other it is likely that the newly merged entity could lift its 
prices without the fear of losing customers (non-coordinated effects). Additionally, even if 
other competitors would remain on the market, they might find it profitable to coordinate 
their market behaviour with the newly merger entity (coordinated effects).
214
  
The most important single factor when defining the relevant markets is demand-side 
substitutability.
215
 As stated in the Market Definition Notice, a firm cannot have a 
significant impact on the prevailing market prices, if its customers are in a position to 
switch easily to alternative products. Therefore, market definition is needed to identify the 
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alternative sources of supply for the customers of the undertakings involved in the 
geographic area in which they operate.
216
  
Demand-side substitutability is tested in the EU – as well as in the US antitrust law – 
through the SSNIP test which estimates how customers would react to a hypothetical small 
but significant (5 to 10 per cent) non-transitory permanent increase in price.
217
 If 
substitution is enough to make the price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss 
in sales, additional substitutes and areas are included to the analysis. This is done until the 
set of products and geographical areas is such that small but permanent increases in 
relative prices would be profitable.
218
 This is the market that the Commission shall assess.  
3.4.2. Market Power in the Relevant Market 
As important as market definition is, it is only the first step in merger analysis.
219
 Market 
definition is not an end itself but instead it is used to identify whether the relevant 
undertakings possess market power.
220
 
There exists no instrument that would clearly measure market power. Instead competition 
authorities and courts must rely on a variety of concepts, instruments, and criteria in order 
to deduce the degree of market power that exists or is likely to exist after the proposed 
transaction.
221
 Whether the merger will lead to the creation of a harmful amount of market 
power, depends on how it will change the parties’ abilities and incentives to impede 
competition, and whether third parties are able to limit the use of their market power. The 
first indicators that are used to estimate this are the market share figures of the companies 
and the level of market concentration in the market.
222
  
First of all, market shares play a role in determining if a concentration is suitable for the 
simplified procedure.
223
 Similarly market shares exceeding 50 per cent can be regarded in 
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themselves as “evidence of the existence of a dominant market position”.224 Additionally, 
other conclusions can be drawn from market share figures: if the merging entity should 
have a much larger market share than its biggest rival, the case is likely to be examined 
thoroughly. In the case of oligopolistic markets, the symmetry of market shares may raise 
doubts as a clearance decision could lead to collective dominance and coordinated 
effects.
225
  
Another way to approach the subject of market power is to focus on the level of 
concentration by looking at the combined market share of the biggest firms on the market. 
For example, if a market has a dozen competitors but its four largest firms have a 
combined market share of over 75 percent, the existence of an oligopoly is very likely. A 
more sophisticated calculation of market concentration includes the use of concentration 
indices, such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) used by many competition 
authorities including the European Commission. The HHI can be calculated in accordance 
to paragraph 16 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines by “summing the squares of the 
individual market shares of all the firms in the market”. The larger the number, the more 
concentrated the market is (10,000 is a monopoly and 0 is perfect competition).
226
 The 
Commission is unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns in a market with a 
post-merger HHI below 1000.
227
 However, the analysis should not be solely based on the 
HHI since it gives a static view of the market.
228
  
3.4.3. Countervailing Factors and Counterfactual Analysis 
Although offering a relevant starting point for the analysis, the importance of market share 
figures and market concentration is limited in the appraisal of the effects that the merger is 
likely to cause on competition.
229
 Other factors that should be taken into consideration 
include buyer power (i.e. “bargaining strength that the buyer has vis-à-vis the seller in 
commercial negotiations due to its size, its commercial significance to the seller, and its 
ability to switch to alternative suppliers”), and the likelihood of entry (“when entering a 
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market is sufficiently easy, a merger is unlikely to pose any significant anti-competitive 
risk”) that can neutralise competition concerns on the market.230  
In addition, despite the Commission’s ambiguous relationship with efficiency claims, 
particularly before the 2004 Merger Regulation and the adaptation of the SIEC test, the 
potential efficiencies produced by the merger are today also taken into account as a 
countervailing factor. If the Commission should assess that the efficiencies brought by the 
concentration outweigh the harm that it causes to competition, it can be cleared.
231
 In this 
assessment the relevant benchmark is the welfare of consumers, who must benefit from the 
concentration (e.g. in the form of better or cheaper products), in order for efficiency claims 
to be accepted.
232
 However, the Commission’s margin of discretion is limited, for instance 
when the merger would lead into the creation of a dominant position.
233
  
Finally, even if according to the initial assessment of the concentration anti-competitive 
effects are likely, the Commission must take into account that according to the SIEC test it 
should be the concentration that is causing the impediment of competition. A merger 
should not be blocked even if competition is reduced in the market when it is estimated, 
that the prohibition of the transaction is followed by similar impediment of competition.
234
 
The use of causality is not a novel concept in legal theory.
235
 However, causality has 
special relevance in the Commission’s appraisal of failing firm arguments, as lack of 
causality between the merger and the deterioration of competition is needed to be shown in 
order for the Commission to accept the failing firm defence.
236
  
In order to deduce whether causality exists or not, the Commission has to look at two 
scenarios: (1) what would happen in the market if the merger took place, and (2) how 
would the competitive conditions evolve in the absence of the concentration. This 
comparison is known as counterfactual analysis, and it is used to find out the specific 
effects that the merger would have in comparison to changes that would take place even if 
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the merger did not take place.
237
 Normally counterfactual analysis is carried out between 
the pre-merger and post-merger market scenarios. The analysis involving a failing firm is 
different as the pre-merger market conditions are unlikely to prevail in the absence of the 
merger as one of the firms is exiting the market in any case. This is why counterfactual 
analysis in the case of a failing firm is carried out between the post-merger scenario and a 
scenario where the failing firm has exited the market.
238
 
*** 
We are now concluding our review of EU merger control which has covered a range of 
topics beginning from the Treaty of Paris to the substantive assessment of failing firm 
arguments. EU merger control has developed from lacking a legal basis into a well-
established system regulated by a set of legal provisions. This development has been 
affected both by the theories regarding competition law as well as the different, partly 
contradictory, goals that EU competition law and merger control are pursuing. 
Coincidently the failing firm doctrine of the European Commission has gone through a 
similar development. The acceptance of the defence also began from an ad hoc decision of 
the Commission, which the ECJ subsequently confirmed. The requirements for accepting 
the failing firm defence are now established in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the 
Commission. We shall now turn our attention towards this development and assess how the 
competing theories and conflicting goals of merger control have affected it.  
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4. Development of the Failing Firm Defence in EU Merger Control 
Above, we have discussed the theories behind merger control as well as the main features 
of the merger control regime of the European Union. However, as we move on to examine 
the failing firm defence our point of view is converted. As already noted, the failing firm 
defence is actually directly at odds with the fundamental idea of merger control as it is 
used to clear mergers that have anti-competitive effects.  
The parties invoking the failing firm defence are not trying to hide the fact that their 
transaction is likely to cause harm to competition. Instead, they argue that the competition 
authority is faced with a situation where the competitive structure is set to deteriorate in 
any case and that the acceptance of the transaction would actually cause less harm than the 
blocking of the merger.
239
  
This section consists of three parts. First we shall take a look at the origins of the failing 
firm defence in the United States, which has influenced the development of the defence in 
EU merger control that is discussed in the second and third section of this Chapter. The 
aim is to draw a complete picture of this development both before and after the economic 
crisis in order to assess how the failing firm doctrine of the European Commission came to 
be and to detect possible changes in it brought by the recent economic turmoil. 
4.1.Origins of the Failing Firm Defence 
The formation of the basic principles of the failing firm defence doctrine can be tracked 
back to early antitrust enforcement in the United States. Although the doctrine has been 
later adopted in many different competition law jurisdictions, it reached EU merger control 
relatively late. This is probably why the theoretical basis of the failing firm doctrine in the 
EU is heavily influenced by US case law and legal literature.
240
 The relevant case law and 
theoretical considerations are introduced in this section. 
The first cases in which the failing firm defence was applied in the United States did not 
explicitly stipulate what is the central yardstick against which the defence should be 
assessed. The early case law as well as the legal literature following it emphasised the 
social harms – unemployment and the loss of investments by shareholders – that would 
follow from bankruptcies caused by the denial of such transactions. These arguments 
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remained influential among legal scholars even after the US Supreme Court seemed to 
redefine its approach. Modern understanding of the defence is based more firmly on 
economic arguments as the approval of an anti-competitive concentration is seen 
dependent on whether, it causes less harm to competition, than its prohibition and the exit 
of the failing company’s assets.241  
4.1.1. Early US Case Law Emphasised Social Aspects 
International Shoe
242
 is commonly regarded as the first case where a merger was accepted 
on the basis of the failing firm defence.
243
 In its judgment, the Supreme Court established 
two requirements which the parties had to show in order for the defence to be accepted: (1) 
the failing company should be facing severe financial difficulties, and (2) there should be 
no alternative purchaser for the failing firm’s assets. These requirements remained 
unchanged for almost four decades until the Supreme Court further developed the doctrine 
in Citizen Publishing.
244
 This judgment added a third criterion which a merger should 
satisfy in order to be accepted on the basis of the defence: (3) the chances of restructuring 
the failing company through bankruptcy should be assessed unlikely.
245
 
In International Shoe, the parties to the concentration, McElwain and International Shoe, 
were both shoe producers operating in the United States. McElwain ran into financial 
difficulties due to a general decrease in demand and was acquired by its much stronger 
competitor in 1921.
246
 After the compatibility of the acquisition with the Sherman Act was 
challenged, the matter ended up being decided by the Supreme Court, which approved the 
acquisition on the basis of what became known as the failing firm defence. The Supreme 
Court essentially reasoned that the other option being business failure creating losses to 
shareholders and unemployment to places where the company had plants, the acquisition 
of the company’s shares by a competitor, that wishes to increase its capacity in order to 
satisfy the increasing demand, was preferable as there were no other potential buyers.247 
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Although the importance of the case to the development of the failing firm doctrine is 
undisputable, it has been questioned whether International Shoe was a failing firm case in 
the sense of the failing firm defence. Indeed, both critics and supporters of the defence 
have pointed out that the early case law was based on a different – more non-economic 
reasoning.
248
 Kaplan believes that the analysis of the effects of the acquisition was 
sidelined, as the Supreme Court was emphasising the interests of creditors, shareholders 
and the surrounding community of the failing company.
249
 Paredes notes that the Supreme 
Court considered these private interests only after it had concluded that the merger was not 
anti-competitive. He believes that the judgment has been misinterpreted as these interests 
did not have an impact on the Court’s deliberation.250 However, Paredes also recognises an 
economic rationale in the Supreme Court’s judgment although he does not agree with it. 
The acquisition and International Shoe’s motive for the purchase were not seen anti-
competitive as McElwain was bound to exit the market, in which case the transaction was 
merely considered as a way to restore the failing firm’s capacity on the market.251  
The US failing firm doctrine was further developed some 40 years later by the Supreme 
Court’s judgment in General Dynamics.252 General Dynamics, a deep mining coal 
producer, wished to acquire a strip-mining coal producer, United Electric, but the 
transaction was challenged as it did not meet the requirements of the failing firm defence 
established in earlier case law. As the Supreme Court noted, United Electric was a healthy 
company at the time of its acquisition, and there was no evidence suggesting that there 
would not have been alternative purchasers.
253
 However, the acquisition was cleared after 
the Supreme Court reformulated its interpretation of the failing firm defence: 
“The failing company defense presupposes that the effect on competition and the loss to 
stockholders and injury to the communities where its plants were operated will be less if a 
company continues to exist even as a party to a merger than if it disappears entirely from the 
market. It is, in a sense, a "lesser of two evils" approach, in which the possible threat to 
competition resulting from an acquisition is deemed preferable to the adverse impact on 
competition and other losses if the company goes out of business.”254 
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Essentially the transaction was approved even though United Electric was not a failing 
firm per se because “even if it remained in the market, it did not have sufficient reserves to 
compete effectively for long-term contracts”.255 The decision has been heavily criticised 
because it emphasised social considerations. Baxter has described the decision as a kind of 
“special government bailout” benefitting the interests of shareholders and employees of the 
company.
256
  Furthermore, unlike in International Shoe where competition did not 
deteriorate because of the transaction, in General Dynamics these social considerations or 
private interests were seen overcome competition concerns.
257
 
The effect that economic theories concerning competition law and merger control have had 
on the development on the case law that created the failing firm defence, is somewhat 
difficult to estimate. During the time the Supreme Court was ruling on International Shoe, 
modern schools of thought had not yet emerged and the decision was based on more 
traditional thinking concerning market power: the acquisition could be cleared as it did not 
affect market structures since the merging parties were operating on separate markets. 
However, during the time when General Dynamics was ruled upon, Harvard School was 
having considerable influence on US antitrust law enforcement. Therefore, Harvard School 
could have had an influence on the reformulation of the failing firm defence. However, 
Harvard School’s outright disapproval of market concentration would have advised against 
the approval of failing firm arguments. Thus giving credit or criticism to Harvard School 
for the development of the early case law might be without basis. It is more likely that the 
early cases were influenced by the social and political surroundings more than competition 
law theories. These surroundings seemed to favour social considerations over economic 
ones.  
4.1.2. Academic Debate over the Defence and a More Economic Reasoning 
After General Dynamics the failing firm defence started to attract attention from legal and 
economic scholars. The early cases have faced a lot of criticism, but the defence has also 
been defended, by the likes of Campbell who is regarded as the first academic to have 
constructed a complete economic analysis of the defence.
258
  He did this by producing a 
series of economic models illustrating the efficiencies and positive effects on welfare the 
approval of the failing firm defence has. Campbell argued that under specific conditions, 
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the acceptance of anti-competitive mergers could in fact be enhancing competition. He 
emphasised the importance of preserving aggregate capacity on the market which in turn 
would secure a lower price level, whereas the exit of the failing firm and decrease in 
overall capacity would harm consumers and the society as a whole by increasing market 
prices. Since maintaining the failing firm’s production on the market is crucial from the 
perspective of economic efficiency, its acquisition by a company that is willing to maintain 
its production capacity on the market is preferable even if the buyer would be in a 
dominant position.
259
  
Campbell argued that the assets of the failing firm should not leave the market as devoting 
them “to their next best use” would not be economically efficient.260 The opposite is true in 
the case of accepting the failing firm defence where the buyer is interested in acquiring the 
assets only because it expects the efficiencies and profits following from the acquisition to 
be greater than in the case of the exit of the failing firm’s assets.261  
Campbell was ready to admit that the acquisition of a failing company would lead to a loss 
in economic efficiency if the following market structure resembled a monopoly.
262
 In such 
circumstances, the dominant firm would not have the incentive to maintain the total output 
on the market, but would instead reduce production and lift prices causing a loss of 
economic efficiency. However, he strongly opposed labelling the failing firm defence 
inefficient because of this. Campbell noted that critics of the defence had failed to take into 
account that economic welfare and competition were going to be lost in any case, whether 
the rescue merger was accepted or not.
263
  
McChesney – another prominent defender of the failing firm defence – went even further 
than this, as he believed that the acceptance of the defence would always be efficient. 
According to his thinking a dominant firm would not be interested of the merger unless it 
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was thinking that the transaction would lower its production costs, which in turn would be 
followed by an increase in output and in overall welfare. If a failing firm was to be allowed 
to exit, its assets would be lost while the remaining competitors would be able to lift their 
prices due to the increased demand they would be facing and the decreased overall 
capacity on the market. In other words, the result would be exactly the opposite than what 
antitrust legislation aims to ensure.
264
  
However, the defence and its supporters have also been heavily criticised. Oinonen points 
out, that the absolute belief in keeping the assets in the market disregards the fact that most 
transactions do not actually produce efficiency gains. This is why the parties claiming that 
the approval of the defence would be efficient should produce evidence to back their 
claims. If efficiencies cannot to be shown to materialise, the post-merger scenario should 
be estimated so that the assets will exit the market regardless of the approval of the 
concentration. Moreover, blocking the merger might lead to
 
remaining competitors 
dividing the assets of the failing firm more evenly between themselves, which is preferable 
compared to the situation where a single dominant firm would acquire the whole lot.
265
 
This is why competition authorities should focus on the competitive structure of the 
market. The failing firm defence should not be accepted if the market structure would 
remain competitive after the failing firm’s exit.266  
Paredes fears that the overemphasis of exiting assets turns the failing firm defence into an 
absolute defence under which all transactions where the defence is invoked are 
accepted.
267
 This is particularly problematic when there is overcapacity in the market. In 
these situations the approval of the failing firm defence may distort competition by keeping 
an inefficient producer’s assets on the market instead of reallocating them to markets, 
where they could be of more use.
268
  
After its creation in US case law the failing firm defence has been both defended and 
opposed. The early case law faced criticism particularly because it included (social) goals 
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outside the scope of antitrust law. Today, however, in general it is recognised by both 
scholars and competition authorities, that the acceptance of the defence can be preferable 
compared to the exit of the failing company at least under some circumstances. It is the 
nature of these circumstances and the importance given to different factors in the appraisal 
process of the merger that continues to be debated.  
The reason why the defence is no longer opposed per se, might be the fact that because of 
the legal literature commenting the early case law, the failing firm defence developed into 
having a more economically sound reasoning behind it. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
economics has gradually gained more ground in competition law thinking. In relation to 
this, contemporary supporters of the failing firm defence tend to lean on the likes of 
Campbell as opposed to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in early US case law.  
Campbell’s reasoning clearly shows how the rationale behind the defence had moved on 
from social considerations into having a more economically sound basis. The fact that 
Campbell stresses the importance of efficiencies in the acceptance of the defence seems 
also to illustrate the influence of Chicago School in competition law theory. Campbell’s 
emphasis of retaining the failing firm’s assets on the market – which was not discussed in 
early case law – has influenced the later development of the doctrine also in the EU. 
The critics of the failing firm defence, on the other hand, can be interpreted to oppose the 
oversimplifications of the Chicago School regarding efficiencies, as they have demanded 
that these efficiencies are actually proven. The critique can also be seen compatible with 
the effects-based approach demanding a case-by-case analysis of mergers: instead of just 
observing whether the assets of the failing firm would exit the market attention should be 
paid on how this would affect the overall capacity on the market. If the exit of the failing 
firm’s assets is formalistically considered to be a reason to accept the defence this might 
lead to incorrect decisions if the overall capacity in the case at hand is not taken into 
consideration. These views may have affected the importance given to counterfactual 
analysis as opposed to the formal failing firm criteria in the failing firm doctrine of the EU 
the development of which we shall look into next. 
4.2. Development of the Defence in EU merger Control before the Economic Crisis 
Similarly as in the United States the failing firm defence became recognised in the merger 
control of the European Commission through case law. Although the US case law and the 
theoretical underpinnings following it have had an influence on the assessment of the 
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defence in the European Union, there are also noticeable differences in the way in which 
the failing firm doctrine has developed in these two jurisdictions. 
First of all, the time frame, during which the failing firm defence has been assessed, has 
been very different. When in the 1990’s EU merger control was taking its first steps with 
the concept of the failing firm defence, it had already become well-established in the 
United States.
269
 Partly due to its late arrival, there have not been as many cases in Europe 
where the failing firm defence has been invoked and even fewer of those in which the 
Commission has accepted the defence. As already mentioned, the Commission has faced 
criticism because of the “harsh” criteria it has set for the acceptance of the defence. 
However, it should be noted that the defence is not accepted particularly easily in the 
United States either.
270
 
Secondly, the approach in US merger control has also been described as more formal – or 
absolute – in the sense that the acceptance of the defence is based on the fulfilment of 
formal conditions, whereas the Commission is willing to look at the actual effects the 
transaction will have on the competitive structure through counterfactual analysis even if 
the formal failing firm criteria would not be fulfilled.
271
 
4.2.1. Kali and Salz: Criteria to Assess Causality 
The first time the European Commission encountered failing firm argumentation was in 
Aerospatiale in which aerospace companies Aerospatiale and Alenia were proposing to 
purchase Boeing De Havilland’s regional aircraft division.272 The transaction would have 
affected competition in three relevant markets one of which was the market of medium-
size turbo-prop airplanes. In the market in question, the merged entity would have reached 
a market share of 64 per cent worldwide, and the Commission concluded that the 
concentration would have created a dominant position.
273
 
The parties were arguing that in the absence of the transaction Boeing would be forced to 
shut down De Havilland. However, the Commission did not believe that De Havilland was 
actually failing. Moreover, the Commission argued that if De Havilland should exit the 
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market there would be other interested, and less dominant, buyers.
274
 According to it the 
“basic elements” of the defence – even though the elements themselves were not clearly 
outlined – were not satisfied.275 Also, the fact that De Havilland was a failing division 
instead of a failing firm, i.e. Boing was not failing in its entirety, might have made it more 
difficult for the Commission to accept the defence.
276
  
Although the Commission was dealing with unfamiliar territory as similar argumentation 
had not been invoked in previous cases, the circumstances of the case seemed to make it 
fairly easy for the Commission to dismiss such claims without the need of outlining the 
specific conditions under which the failing firm defence could be accepted.   
This was not the case in Kali and Salz
277
 where the Commission came to accept the 
defence for the first time. The case concerned a joint venture between Kali und Salz (K+S) 
and the Treuhandanstalt (Treuhand), which would have combined the potash and rock-salt 
activities of K+S and Mitteldeutsche Kali AG (MdK) owned by Treuhand. The 
Commission found that the transaction raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
common market and initiated Phase II proceedings.
278
 
The effects of the merger on competition in the relevant markets would have been 
undoubtedly negative. The Commission found that the merger would lead to a de facto 
monopoly on the German market for potash used for agricultural purposes.
279
 However, the 
parties argued the MdK was a failing firm – in fact, on the verge of bankruptcy due to the 
drop in sales after the collapse of Eastern European markets – and without the merger, 
MdK would disappear from the market, after which K+S would acquire its market share.
280
 
The Commission was willing to consider this argument. According to its reasoning, 
although a merger leading to the creation or reinforcement of a dominant position would 
normally be prohibited this should not be the case when the competitive harm would also 
follow if the merger was prohibited, i.e. when the merger could not be seen to cause the 
deterioration of the competitive structure, which would take place in any case. Thus, the 
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defence could be accepted if the parties could establish that it is not the concentration that 
is causing the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
281
 In order to estimate 
whether causality existed between the merger and the deterioration of the competitive 
structure the Commission formulated the initial criteria (Kali and Salz criteria) which the 
concentration should meet in order to be accepted in EC merger control: 
 “a merger generally is not the cause of the deterioration of the competitive structure if it is 
clear that: 
- the acquired undertaking would in the near future be forced out of the market if not taken 
over by another undertaking, 
- the acquiring undertaking would take over the market share of the acquired undertaking if it 
were forced out of the market, 
- there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase”.282 
 
The necessity of fulfilling these criteria – which is of particular interest in this thesis – was, 
however, left somewhat unclear as the Commission added that in a merger such as the case 
at hand, where the transaction would lead to the creation of a monopoly, “it is particularly 
important that the three conditions should be met”.283 This begs the question whether the 
conditions need to be met if the post-merger market structure contains other competitors.  
The Commission found the parties’ submissions regarding MdK’s poor financial state 
believable and accepted the first criterion, as MdK would be forced to exit the market in 
the absence of the merger, following the collapse of Eastern European markets and 
German unification, which had caused a considerable collapse in its sales. The 
Commission did not demand that the exit should take place immediately if it could be 
expected “in the near future with a sufficient degree of probability”.284 
The second Kali and Salz criterion dealt with the accruement of the failing firm’s market 
share by the acquirer. Again the parties were able to convince the Commission which 
deduced that as K+S would become the sole distributor in Germany it was very likely that 
it would inherit MdK’s market share after its exit from the market.285 The third criterion 
was also met as the parties were able to show that they had thoroughly searched an 
alternative purchaser. The Commission also noted that “no other undertaking could 
achieve the same synergies as K+S would be able to realize as purchaser of MdK”.286 
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Consequently, as the criteria, set out by the Commission to estimate whether there was a 
causal link between the merger and the harm caused to the competitive structure, were met, 
the Commission concluded that although after the transaction “a dominant position on the 
German market for agricultural potash will be strengthened…K+S’s dominant position 
would have been reinforced even in the absence of the merger”.287 Thus, the transaction 
was declared compatible with the common market.  
However, the French Government was not pleased with the decision enabling a German 
company to become a monopolist in parts of the agricultural market of the European 
Community and it brought action against it, and so the legality of the failing firm defence 
became to be estimated by the ECJ. The French Government pleaded annulment of the 
Commission’s decision on four different grounds, one of them being the incorrect 
application of the failing firm defence. The French Government submitted that the defence 
originates from the United States and that the Commission had failed to take into account 
the same criteria as is applied in the US antitrust legislation, which would have been the 
only way to ensure the correct application of the doctrine.
288
 The Court of Justice denied 
the Government’s interpretation noting that although the Commission’s criteria differed 
from that of the ones used in the United States this in itself was not a ground to contest the 
validity of the decision. Furthermore, the Court found the criteria set by the Commission to 
be relevant and that the Commission had correctly appraised them in its decision.
289
  
The Court also confirmed that the Commission’s notion regarding causality between the 
merger and deterioration of competition was correct. In fact, the ECJ’s interpretation of a 
rescue merger went even further than the Commission’s, as it held that the clearance of 
such a merger did not need to be better in terms of competition, but it was sufficient that 
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the competitive structure would not deteriorate any further than in the absence of the 
concentration.
290
  
Kali and Salz was an important case because of many reasons. First and foremost, it set a 
precedent on which European companies could rely, if their transaction was not causing 
the deterioration of the competitive structure which would take place also in the absence of 
the merger. Secondly, although the Commission applied the three criteria it set for the 
approval of the defence, the Commission held causality as the deciding factor while the 
criteria were formed to help estimate whether the transaction was causing the deterioration 
of competition. Essentially the Commission’s decision regarding the acceptance of the 
defence was not dependent on the fulfilment of the formal criteria. This meant that the 
Commission was not following the formalistic approach of US merger control criticised by 
some for turning the defence absolute. However, neither the Commission nor the ECJ did 
perhaps stress this enough. It could be argued that some of the criticism the Commission 
has later received for applying an overly difficult test for rescue mergers follows from the 
confusion regarding the relationship between the “lack of causality” requirement and the 
formal criteria.
291
 
The Commission’s and the ECJ’s willingness to emphasise the “lack causality” as the basis 
for accepting a rescue merger can be considered remarkable and to some extent surprising. 
In the 1990’s, the EU merger control was still being governed by the 1989 Merger 
Regulation and the dominance test. Under this test the Commission had been unwilling to 
accept efficiencies following from mergers. The approach that the Commission was 
applying was more formal as the creation or strengthening of a dominant position almost 
automatically meant that the concentration would be found incompatible with the common 
market. Hence, the approval of Kali and Salz, where the concentration was cleared even 
though a de facto monopoly market structure followed, was ground-breaking. It indicated 
the application of an effects-based approach, where the circumstances of the case at hand 
were taken into account, even though this approach was not fully adopted in EU merger 
control before the 2004 Merger Regulation.  
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The approval of this merger and the market structure following from it also showed that 
the Commission was not relying on the thinking of Harvard School, which emphasised the 
importance of the structure and lack of concentration in the market. Instead it could be 
argued that the Commission had taken due notice of the theory concerning contestable 
markets. The Commission approved the transaction as the minimum efficient scale in the 
German potash market dictated that it could be operated profitably only by a single entity. 
4.2.2. Initial Approach towards the Failing Division Defence 
The approval of Kali and Salz did not lead to a string of similar clearances by the 
Commission. Instead, the Commission applied the criteria strictly especially in the cases of 
failing divisions. 
The first case to follow was Saint-Gobain which concerned a joint venture – of a 
subsidiary of Saint-Gobain; Wacker-Chemie’s subsidiary ESK; and NOM, a private 
investment and development company owned almost in its entirety by the Dutch 
Government – which would acquire the assets of ESK’s Dutch subsidiary and its two 
German processing facilities dedicated to the silicon carbide business. All the parties were 
active in the production of a synthetic mineral called SiC, and the Commission found that 
the proposed joint venture would lead to the creation of a dominant position in the market 
for processed SiC. After performing the SSNIP test, the Commission found that ”the 
parties will be in a position to impose a small but significant price increase, since the 
smaller competitors will not be in a position to challenge the parties, nor will potential 
competitors enter the market in the foreseeable future”.292  
The parties, however, argued that ESK’s SiC business was in poor condition. The 
Commission approached this argument by referring to the Kali and Salz criteria which 
needed to be met in order to accept a transaction on the basis of the failing firm defence. 
Firstly, the Commission did not find it believable that ESK would exit from the SiC 
markets in the absence of the transaction. Secondly, it assessed that Saint-Gobain and other 
competitors would be incapable of answering to the increased demand following ESK’s 
exit from the market, which would subsequently lead to a major price increase in the 
market. This would, however, attract new entrants on the market which could win over 
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some of ESK’s market share. The Commission estimated that even though Saint-Gobain 
would be able to acquire a major part of ESK’s market share, it could not obtain all of it.293  
Regarding alternative purchasers, the Commission came to the conclusion that the other 
German processing plant of ESK was “one of the most advanced SiC processing plants in 
the world, and could be sold either as a whole or in pieces to third parties”, in which case it 
would remain in the market competing with Saint-Gobain. Not surprisingly, the 
Commission concluded that the joint venture was incompatible with the common market as 
effective competition would be significantly impeded.
294
 
Although the European Commission did go through the Kali and Salz criteria, it can be 
argued that its decision regarding the acceptance of the rescue merger was based on the 
“lack of causality” requirement. The Commission applied the criteria in order to perform a 
counterfactual analysis comparing the deterioration of competition in scenarios following 
the acceptance and the denial of the merger. On the basis of this analysis the Commission 
concluded “that a prohibition of the merger would be the less anti-competitive decision”.295 
Kokkoris notes that the Kali and Salz criteria are very, or according to him, overly 
demanding which is why the parties could not achieve them in Saint-Gobain.
296
 It is 
relatively easy to agree with this notion, since the second Kali and Salz criterion regarding 
the accruement of the failing firm’s entire market share seems too demanding, especially 
as it was shown that Saint-Gobain was in a position to acquire most of it. This probably 
had an effect on the Commission’s decision to amend the criterion in question in its later 
decisional practice.
297
 However, as it was shown that the concentration did not meet the 
other criteria the Commission was able to reason that the approval of the merger would 
have been the more anti-competitive option. 
The acceptability of the failing division defence arose for the first time after the approval 
of the failing firm defence in Blokker/Toys’R’Us when the Dutch Government requested 
the Commission to examine the transaction where Blokker proposed the purchase of its 
new rival’s, Toys’R’Us’, assets and inventory in the Netherlands.298 The Commission 
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came to the conclusion that following a line of earlier acquisitions, Blokker already had a 
dominant position in the market for specialized toy retail outlets in the Netherlands. In 
addition to the increase in Blokker’s market share, the transaction included a number of 
other harmful factors, such as the complementary nature of the Toys’R’Us’ megastores to 
Blokker’s other retail-stores which would have further strengthened Blokker’s dominance 
on the market. However, Toys’R’Us invoked the failing firm defence arguing that its 
Dutch operations would close down without the merger with Blokker, there being no 
alternative less anti-competitive purchaser, in which case Blokker would gain its market 
share or at least most of it.
 299
  
The Commission began its review regarding these arguments by referring to its earlier 
decisions in which it had stressed the importance of the lack of causality between the 
merger and the creation or strengthening of a dominant position.
300
 After this it again 
moved on to assess the “lack of causality” by looking into to the Kali and Salz criteria. 
The Commission did not believe Blokker would be able to gain all of Toys’R’Us’ market 
share in the absence of the merger.
301
 Nor was it convinced that there would not have been 
less anti-competitive buyers for Toys’R’Us’ Dutch retail-stores. In fact, when considering 
Blokker’s already high market share, the Commission argued, and not without merit, that 
Toys’R’Us had selected to sell its business to “the strongest player on the market”. 
Toys’R’Us argued, that it had rejected buyers that did not have specific knowledge of the 
market or were potential competitors in other geographical markets. However, the 
Commission dismissed such claims as irrelevant.
302
 The merger was found incompatible 
with the common market, which resulted in the rare decision of Commission ordering 
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Blokker to divest the assets, which it already had acquired from Toys’R’Us to an 
independent third party.
303
 
The Commission went through the arguments of the parties regarding the fulfilment of 
Kali and Salz criteria somewhat briefly and seemed to base its decision especially on the 
unfulfilled alternative purchaser requirement. This is reasonable, as the existence of less 
anti-competitive buyers clearly means that blocking the merger is the pro-competitive 
decision. In fact, it is somewhat exceptional that merging parties should invoke the failing 
firm defence if any of the criteria is as obviously being left unsatisfied. 
It appears that the parties had misinterpreted the probability of public intervention as the 
concentration was lacking a community dimension. After being caught red-handed 
following the referral of the case to the Commission, the parties were desperate to come up 
with an excuse to justify their anti-competitive transaction. Moreover, the parties might 
have misinterpreted the fairly new failing firm doctrine and presumed that the Commission 
was applying it much more leniently – the Commission had after all accepted a de facto 
monopoly on the basis of the defence. If this was the case, Toys’R’Us failed to recognize 
that MdK had desperately searched other less anti-competitive buyers which had persuaded 
the Commission to accept the defence. 
The Commission, somewhat surprisingly, did not discuss the matter of failing division 
defence in its decision. This might have followed from the fact that its Kali and Salz 
decision, and the applicability of the failing firm defence in EU merger control, was at the 
time being reviewed by the ECJ and the Commission was waiting for the judgment before 
further elaborating its failing firm doctrine.  
However, the Commission got the chance to deal with the matter shortly after being 
backed by the ECJ.
304
 The Commission developed its doctrine concerning the failing 
division defence further in Bertelsmann.
305
 The notified transaction concerned the German 
pay-TV supplier Premiere, which was owned by Bertelsmann’s subsidiary CLT-UFA (37,5 
%), Canal+ (37,5 %) and Kirch (25 %). The parties proposed that Canal+ would divest its 
shareholding, and that CLT-UFA and Kirch should increase their shares in Premiere to 50 
                                                          
303
 European Commission, Press Release Blokker/Toys’R’Us, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-97-
570_en.htm.  
304
 See France and Others (supra note 11) discussed in section 4.2.1. 
305
 Case No IV/M.993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, Commission Decision of 27 May 1998. 
58 
 
per cent each. Kirch would also transfer its digital pay-TV channel’s assets to Premiere and 
place its pay-TV and pay-per-view rights at Premiere’s disposal by sublicensing them.306 
The transaction was considered to be problematic by the Commission for a multitude of 
reasons. Premiere and Kirch’s DF 1 were basically the only pay-TV suppliers in Germany, 
and their merger would have led to Premiere having a near-monopoly as a pay-TV 
supplier. In addition to that, the conversion of Premiere into a joint venture between CLT-
UFA and Kirch, and the termination of DF 1’s independent pay-TV supplier activities 
would have meant that Premiere would have become the only pay-TV programme and 
marketing platform in Germany.
307
 Thus the Commission argued that the concentration 
would have led to the creation or strengthening of Premiere’s dominant position on the 
pay-TV market in Germany.
308
  
The parties tried to persuade the Commission by arguing along the lines of the Kali and 
Salz decision, that DF 1 had only enjoyed limited success so far and would otherwise be 
forced to close down, which is why competition would not be affected by the 
concentration, i.e. the transaction was not causing the creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position.
309
 The Commission was quick to point out that the case at hand differed 
from Kali and Salz, as DF 1 formed only a part of Kirch’s pay-TV business and should be 
regarded as a failing division in which case 
”particularly high standards must be set for establishing that the conditions for a defence on 
the grounds of lack of a causal link have been met. If this were not so, any concentration 
involving the disposal of an allegedly unprofitable area of a business could be justified for 
merger-control purposes by a declaration on the part of the seller that, without the merger, it 
would be necessary to close down the seller’s business in that area”.310 
In other words, the Commission did not deny the possibility of accepting the failing 
division defence but decided to set the bar for approving it even higher than in the case of a 
standard failing firm defence by demanding further credible proof of the lack of causality. 
Much to the disappointment of the parties the Commission did not find that they would 
have reached this bar. Instead the Commission stated that “Kirch’s abandonment of the 
pay-TV market is simply a management decision to give up an area of its business which 
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has not lived up to the management’s expectations”. The parties had referred to DF 1’s 
initial losses which the Commission considered ”insufficient to establish why DF 1 would 
have to cease trading”.311 Thus, the first criterion was not met. 
The Commission dealt with the failing division aspect of the transaction only while 
discussing the first criterion. This can be considered logical as an unprofitable division’s 
exit is dependent on the management’s willingness to keep funding it. The Commission 
seemed to place a high standard for the acceptance of the failing division defence, when 
requiring that the exit of the division must be caused by something more than the 
management’s unmaterialized expectations regarding the division’s profitability. Such an 
interpretation is not in line with the theory of contestable markets demanding that there are 
no exit barriers which the Commission seemed to have endorsed earlier in Kali and Salz.  
The other Kali and Salz criteria were not satisfied either. The Commission was particularly 
disappointed with the ”mere reference to Kirch‘s lack of success in identifying” other 
potentially interested partners, noting that it had set ”stringent requirements for 
establishing that there is no possible alternative purchaser to the acquiring undertaking” in 
its Kali and Salz decision. Consequently, the concentration was declared incompatible with 
the common market.
312
   
In its earlier decisions, the Commission had treated the failure to meet the Kali and Salz 
conditions as evidence of a causal link between the merger and the deterioration of the 
competitive market structure. Although it expressed similar comments in the case at hand, 
the Commission added that ”even if Kirch terminated DF 1’s operations the negative 
effects on competition would be less severe” as this would ”enable competing pay-TV 
organisations to acquire Kirch‘s pay-TV distribution rights and enter the pay-TV market in 
competition with Premiere”.313 
In other words, the Commission pointed out that the counterfactual scenario where the 
failing company or division in this case would exit the market, would be better in terms of 
competition than the approval of the transaction. Although this appears to be compatible 
with the Commission’s earlier decisions, it might have confused some to think that the 
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parties invoking the failing firm defence have to fulfil both the formal criteria set in the 
Kali and Salz decision as well as the “lack of causality” requirement that is assessed with 
the use of counterfactual analysis. As stated above, it is argued here, however, that both the 
formal criteria and the “lack of causality” requirement are two pieces of the same 
assessment, in which the former is used as a “proxy” to estimate whether the latter – on the 
basis of which the decision regarding the acceptance of the rescue merger is made – is 
satisfied. This decision, where these two pieces were discussed separately, in a way offered 
a glimpse of what was to come in relation to the question of whether the Commission 
regards the fulfilment of the formal criteria always necessary for the clearance of rescue 
mergers.
314
 
The following failing division cases kept hitting the same wall as Bertelsmann had done.  
In Rewe/Meinl Rewe Group proposed the acquisition of Julius Meinl which, together with 
its subsidiaries, owned a total of 341 shops, including supermarkets, discount stores, 
hypermarkets, and a chain of delicatessens, in Austria. Rewe’s subsidiary Billa was already 
the market leader in Austrian food-retailing.
315
  
In its competitive assessment, the Commission came to the conclusion that pretty much 
everything – from the location of the shops to the management of the chains – was in 
favour of the merging entity and hence would only increase its market share in the future. 
The parties replied to the concerns by invoking the failing firm defence.
316
  
Again, the Commission began its appraisal regarding the defence by acknowledging that 
the Kali and Salz criteria were needed to be met in order to establish that merger was not 
the cause of the deterioration of the competitive structure. And again, as in Bertelsmann, 
the Commission noted that the case at hand was actually dealing with the failing division 
defence, as Meinl’s retailing division accounted only a part of its business activities and 
subsidiaries. The Commission used the same wording as in Bertelsmann to underline that 
because of this the parties faced a heavier burden of proof in establishing the “lack of 
causality” requirement as Meinl’s retailing division’s exit from the market should not be 
merely a “management decision”.317  
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In Rewe/Meinl the Commission specified how it estimates the first criterion, the failing 
firm’s exit from the market. The Commission noted, that whilst it was true that Meinl's 
financial situation had deteriorated in recent years, the parties did not submit “any evidence 
to suggest that Meinl is already, or is about to become, insolvent”.318 In Kali and Salz, the 
Commission had not demanded that insolvency proceedings would have been underway or 
looming in the very imminent future, as MdK’s closure was very probable.319 In 
Rewe/Meinl the Commission may have wished to clarify the importance of near insolvency 
as a sign of the failing firm’s likely exit. 
Regarding the second and the third criteria the Commission also found the parties’ 
admissions insufficient and contradictory. The parties had claimed that Spar was the only 
alternative buyer, and as it held a similar market share as Rewe/Billa, it could not be a less 
harmful purchaser. However, the Commission used this reasoning to point out that 
Rewe/Billa would not be able to absorb Meinl’s entire market share as Spar would be in a 
similar position to compete from it after Meinl’s exit. Additionally, the parties’ had failed 
to produce evidence regarding the negotiations with other potential buyer candidates.
320
 
Consequently, the parties had to offer the Commission commitments according to which 
Rewe/Billa would cease to continue the operation of Meinl shops as food-retailing outlets 
in areas where competition concerns were detected by the Commission in order to get the 
merger declared compatible with the common market.
321
 
In the cases following the initial acceptance of the failing firm defence, the Commission 
continued to apply the criteria it had set in Kali and Salz. With the exception of its decision 
in Bertelsmann, the Commission deduced whether there existed a causal link between the 
merger and the deterioration of the competitive structure purely on the basis of fulfilment 
of these criteria. In none of these cases were the parties able to show that the criteria would 
have been met, which led the Commission to deny the acceptance of the defence.  
The cases also offered the Commission an opportunity to clarify its approach towards the 
failing division defence. Baccaro suggests that the “lack of causality” requirement could 
actually be considered as a separate fourth criterion placed on the parties pursuing the 
failing division defence. If this was the case, the Commission’s interpretation of the failing 
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division defence would resemble that of the US merger control’s where the defence is 
more firmly established.
322
  
However, it could be argued that the Commission has rather consistently – ever since of its 
Kali and Salz decision – insisted that this requirement must be fulfilled also in the case of 
failing firms.
323
 Instead, the Commission has demanded that in the case of a failing division 
defence the fulfilment of this requirement needs to be shown even more clearly. More 
importantly, the Commission set the bar for accepting the fulfilment of the first Kali and 
Salz criterion very high by demanding that the decision to close down the operations of the 
division cannot be based on unfulfilled expectations regarding the division’s profitability. 
This differed from the Commission’s approach in Kali and Salz where it seemed to endorse 
the theory of contestable markets.
324
 Instead the Commission’s initial approach towards the 
failing division defence was more in line with ordoliberalism and the avoidance of 
monopolistic market structures. This goes to show that the Commission has not followed a 
single theory when developing its approach towards failing firm and division arguments.   
4.2.3. Formal Criteria is Reformulated but Sidelined by Counterfactual Analysis? 
After approving the failing firm defence in Kali and Salz, the European Commission had 
interpreted the defence strictly. During the 1990’s no other transaction was able to satisfy 
the stringent criteria set by the Commission for the appraisal of failing firm arguments. 
However, in 2001 the Commission’s decision in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim turned out to 
be significant in further developing the interpretation on how rescue mergers should be 
assessed in EU merger control.
325
 
The case concerned the acquisition of sole control over two chemical production 
companies, Eurodiol and Pantochim, by BASF, which had world-wide activities in the 
production and distribution of chemicals. The transaction gave rise to competitive concerns 
in several markets – including the combination of the only producers of certain chemicals 
in the EEA – and the Commission assessed that it was likely to lead to the creation of a 
dominant position. BASF replied to these concerns by invoking the failing firm defence 
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noting that it would gain a comparable position even in the absence of the merger, and that 
in any event the assets of the businesses in question would exit the market.
326
  
As the Commission moved on to assess these claims it found that only two out of the three 
original Kali and Salz criteria were suitable for assessment of the defence in the case at 
hand. The merging parties should still show that the failing company would in the near 
future be forced out of the market without the transaction and that there is no less anti-
competitive alternative purchaser for the firm. However, the criterion demanding the 
accruement of the failing firm’s market share was ill-suited, since BASF was not becoming 
a monopolist following the transaction and it was not going to gain all of Eurodiol’s and 
Pantochim’s market share.327  
The Commission explained the relevance of what would become the new third criterion by 
noting that the application of the first two criteria does not rule out the possibility that the 
assets of the failing firm could return to the relevant market following the company’s 
bankruptcy if acquired by other competitors operating on the market. According to the 
Commission in such a situation “the economic effects would be similar to a take-over of 
the failing firms themselves by an alternative purchaser” and that “it needs to be 
established in addition to the first two criteria, that the assets to be purchased would 
inevitably disappear from the market in the absence of the merger”.328 Following this 
reasoning, the Commission presented its new formulation of the failing firm criteria:  
“(a) the acquired undertaking would in the near future be forced out of the market if not 
taken over by another undertaking,  
 (b) there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase, and 
(c) the assets to be acquired would inevitably exit the market if not taken over by 
another undertaking.”329 
 
In the case at hand, the Commission was ready to accept that the first criterion was met as 
both Eurodiol and Pantochim had been placed under a pre-bankruptcy regime. Similarly, a 
suitable buyer for the assets of Eurodiol and Pantochim had already been searched during 
the pre-bankruptcy period, but apart from BASF no viable offers had been submitted, 
which was sufficient for establishing that the second criterion was met.
330
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The newly formulated third criterion was also fulfilled, as the Commission believed that 
there would not have been other suitable candidates to take on the costly and 
environmentally risky production of Eurodiol’s and Pantochim’s plants. According to the 
Commission the exit of the companies’ assets following from the blocking of the 
transaction “most probably” would have lead “to a considerable deterioration of market 
conditions, to the disadvantage of the customers”.331 
The rationality behind the third criterion was emphasised even as the Commission moved 
on to its counterfactual analysis – which the Commission now decided to perform, even 
after it had concluded that the formal failing firm criteria were met. The Commission 
found that the exit of the failing companies’ production capacities from the market would 
have caused “a significant capacity shortage for products” which already were offered on 
the market “under very tight capacity constraints”, as the remaining competitors would not 
have been able to increase their production to meet the increased demand. The capacity 
constraints combined to the inelastic demand on the market led the Commission to 
conclude that there would have been a significant price increase if the merger was blocked 
and the assets of these firms exited the market. Because of these reasons, the Commission 
came to conclude that “the market conditions would be more favourable for the customers 
after the merger”.332 
The amendment of the third criterion can be seen reasonable as the market share criterion 
set in Kali and Salz had been mostly suitable for mergers where the market structure was 
changing from a duopoly to a monopoly. In a market, where there are more competitors, it 
would be very hard for the purchaser to show that it would be able to gain the entire market 
share of the failing firm in the absence of the merger.
333
 In addition to that, the renewed 
third criterion was more adapted to take into account the overall capacity of the market and 
the effects that the failing firm’s exit could have on market prices.  
The inclusion of this criterion is strongly advocated by the likes of Campbell, who consider 
that such a criterion is needed for preserving the overall capacity on the market and to 
impede price increases. And while scholars such as Paredes might be critical of the 
emphasis placed on the exit of the failing company’s assets, they would be pleased that the 
Commission continued to perform a counterfactual analysis even after it was shown that 
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the formal failing firm criteria was met.
334
 This goes to show that the Commission’s 
application of the failing firm doctrine is not absolute, as it was ready to consider whether 
the clearance of the merger actually was less anti-competitive than its blocking. Essentially 
this means that the Commission would also be ready to block a merger even if the 
transaction satisfied the formal failing firm criteria. 
After assessing – and dismissing – failing firm argumentation in several cases since its 
decision in Kali and Salz the Commission’s decision to approve a problematic transaction 
on the basis of the failing firm defence did not cause as much bewilderment as perhaps the 
initial acceptance of the defence. The earlier decisional practice may have removed any 
doubt on whether parties could trick the Commission to clear anti-competitive mergers.  
Nevertheless the clearance of BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim was exceptional as the merger 
combined the only producers of certain chemicals in the EEA. Similarly to Kali and Salz 
the Commission again accepted the creation of a monopolistic market structure as the 
deterioration of competition was not caused by the merger. Again this is compatible with 
the theory of contestable markets according to which such a market structure is not 
problematic as new entrants can emerge if the monopolist should raise its prices above 
competitive level.  
After BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, the Commission got a chance to test the revised criteria 
in the context of a failing division in Newscorp/Telepiu’.335 The case concerned the Italian 
pay-TV market, where the global media company Newscorp was hoping to acquire the sole 
control over two Italian pay-TV platforms, Telepiu and Stream, and combine the 
businesses of the two companies.
336
  The problem, according to the Commission, was that 
Telepiu already enjoyed a dominant position on the market with a considerable market 
share, while Stream was its only real contender.
337
 If Newscorp had acquired the two 
companies there would have been “virtually no competition left” and the merger would 
have created a near-monopoly on the Italian the pay-TV market.
338
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Newscorp argued that the failing firm defence could be applied, as without the merger 
Stream’s assets would exit the market and Telepiu would inherit its market share. 
Newscorp was claiming, that it was forced to close down Stream in the absence of the 
merger as the company could not become profitable on its own, and shutting down its 
operations would become cheaper to its parent companies than continuing them.
339
  
The Commission noted that Stream was in fact partly owned by two companies, Telekom 
Italia and Newscorp, the latter of which wished to gain sole control of it and merge it with 
Telepiu. The Commission referred to its decision in Rewe/Meinl to point out that the 
parties were actually invoking the failing division defence.
340
 However, the Commission 
noted a peculiarity in the parties’ argument and added that proving the lack of causality is 
even more important, if the failing division is already partly owned by the acquiring 
company as it “might have strategic reasons to keep its failing division alive even if the 
merger were to be prohibited”. Because of this the Commission found that Stream’s exit 
from the Italian pay-TV market would be “a management decision to abandon a business 
activity” which had not “lived up to the expectations” of its managers.341 
The second criterion was not met either because of similar reasons as in Rewe/Meinl and 
Bertelsmann: the parties were not able to show that they had negotiated with other 
potential buyer candidates, nor the reasons for the failure of the negotiations. As for the 
third requirement, the Commission decided that it did not have to reach a conclusion on the 
matter, as the transaction had already failed to meet the first and the second criterion.
342
  
This can be considered somewhat surprising, as the Commission had not taken such 
“shortcuts” before in its appraisal of the failing firm defence. However, the decision not to 
assess the third criterion might have been affected by fact that Newscorp had invoked the 
defence very late in the process.
343
 This might have left the Commission suspicious of the 
parties’ argument and furthermore the Commission only had a limited amount of time to 
go through the argument thoroughly. Thus, it can be argued that the Commission was not 
setting up a precedent but rather was struggling to meet the deadline to give its decision.  
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In the end, the Commission approved the merger with commitments that were set to ease 
entry barriers.
344
 Baccaro believes that the decision represented a newly developed 
appraisal of the failing firm defence, which now rested on a more economic and less 
legalistic footing as the Commission was more willing to place emphasis on its 
counterfactual analysis. He interprets, that although the Commission did not become 
convinced of the lack of causality between the merger and the detriment caused to the 
competitive structure, as the merger did not meet the revised criteria, it was still willing to 
avoid a “worse counterfactual”, which would have followed from the blocking of the 
merger.
345
 Kyprianides agrees with this interpretation: after estimating the scenario where 
Stream would have exited the market, the Commission found the approval of the merger 
along with the relevant remedies to be more beneficial to the consumers.
346
 This is a 
somewhat bold interpretation, as the Commission makes no reference to a possible worse 
counterfactual in its decision. However, it is consistent with the decisional practice of the 
Commission that followed.  
A similar formula for clearing mergers on the basis of counterfactual analysis was perhaps 
even more clearly adopted in the Andersen cases.
347
 Following the Enron scandal, Arthur 
Andersen’s, which had acted as Enron’s auditor, reputation was damaged so severely that 
it would have been impossible for it to continue its international practices. Therefore most 
of the national Andersen companies were seeking to merge with other “Big Five” 
accounting houses.
348
 
In Europe, three of these mergers came under the scrutiny of the European Commission. 
Failing firm arguments were not formally invoked in any of them, nor did the Commission 
appraise whether the revised failing firm criteria would have been met. However, the 
Commission found that the lack of causality between the mergers and the deterioration of 
competition could be shown even without resorting to the formal failing firm criteria. The 
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Commission became convinced that the remaining competitors were going to divide up the 
businesses of the Andersen enterprise whether the mergers were accepted or not, as there 
were no potential entrants to the market.
349
 In other words, lack of causality was met as the 
counterfactual scenarios did not produce any better outcomes in terms of competition than 
the approval of the transactions.
350
 In fact, the counterfactual analysis showed that blocking 
the mergers would lead to a more heightened risk for collective dominance because of the 
oligopolistic market structure.
351
 
According to Baccaro the Andersen decisions represented a newly discovered readiness by 
the Commission to come up with pragmatic solutions to cases where the application of the 
failing firm defence would have been impractical due to the failure of meeting the formal 
criteria. Arthur Andersen was not a failing firm because of its financial condition, but was 
in any case, going to exit the market rapidly. If the fulfilment of the first criterion was 
uncertain, the third criterion regarding the assets of Andersen would not have been met in 
any case as the skilled labour of the Andersen companies would have been employed by 
the other firms in the market.
352
 The Commission did not want the employees of Andersen 
to be evenly divided between the competitors as this would have increased the likelihood 
of coordination. This is why accepting the concentration was the less harmful option in 
terms of competition.
353
  
In 2007, the Commission followed this practice in JCI/Fiamm in which VB, the 
automotive battery joint venture of JCI and Bosch, was seeking the acquisition of sole 
control over Fiamm’s automotive starter battery business, Fiamm SBB.354 Following a 
very detailed analysis of the relevant product and geographical markets, the Commission 
came to the conclusion that the merger would create a dominant position on the Slovak 
independent aftermarket for car and starter batteries, and as a result it would significantly 
impede effective competition in the common market.
355
  
The parties invoked the failing firm defence on the basis of Fiamm’s lack of available 
funding which would have led to its insolvency in the absence of the merger. The 
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Commission considered Fiamm’s bankruptcy and exit from the market to be indeed very 
likely without the sale of its SBB division. Additionally, the parties were able to persuade 
the Commission to believe that although Fiamm’s search for and negotiations with 
alternative buyer candidates had been limited this was heavily affected by the imminence 
of the insolvency proceedings and the fact that the other competitors could not actually be 
regarded as potential buyers due to their much smaller size. Therefore, the second failing 
firm criterion was also accepted. However, the third criterion regarding the exit of all of 
Fiamm’s assets was not met as the Commission found that although the SBB division 
would be closed following a bankruptcy, its individual assets would not “necessarily” exit 
as they could be purchased and brought back to the market by the smaller producers 
operating on the market and by JCI.
356
 
However, after dismissing the fulfilment of the formal failing firm criteria, the 
Commission stated that the “overall criterion” for assessing the compatibility of a rescue 
merger with the common market was “whether the proposed transaction has to be 
considered to be the cause of the significant impediment of effective competition” which 
was to be estimated by comparing the “merger scenario” with the “liquidation or failed-
firm scenario”. Furthermore, the Commission added that “even if not all of the three 
criteria regarded as especially relevant for the assessment of the 'failing firm defence' are 
satisfied, the Commission has to take due account of the concrete likelihood that FIAMM 
would enter into one of the liquidation procedures if the merger does not go through, and 
therefore has to assess the effects of such liquidation in the context of the appropriate 
merger counterfactual”. In the case at hand, the counterfactual scenarios did not prove to 
be as harmful in terms of deterioration of the competitive structure as the merger scenario 
– and therefore there existed a “causal link between the proposed concentration and the 
adverse effect on competition” – but the transaction could be approved through 
remedies.
357
 
The case showcased that the formal failing firm criteria, although having been 
reformulated in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim, still proved difficult to satisfy. Indeed, the 
third criterion requiring the exit of all of the failing firm’s assets has been estimated to be 
overly difficult, as will be discussed in the following section. More importantly, the case 
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highlighted that “the lack of causality” was indeed the “overall criterion”, and that rescue 
mergers could be approved even if they did not fulfil all the conditions of the formal failing 
firm defence.  
Not everyone agreed with the logic of this decision. Malinauskaite argues that it is 
confusing in terms of legal certainty if rescue mergers are accepted even though they do 
not meet the formal conditions stipulated by the Commission. The relevance of the criteria 
can be questioned if they are not needed to be met and parties to future transactions might 
not have the incentive to invoke the defence if the merger can be accepted purely on the 
basis of a counterfactual analysis.
358
 Oinonen agrees by noting that, because of the strict 
application of the failing firm criteria it might be more rational for the parties to invoke just 
the counterfactual analysis without resorting to failing firm argumentation, especially if 
one or more of the failing firm criteria are likely to be left unfulfilled.
359
  
I believe that the decision clarified the relationship between the overall criterion (lack of 
causality), and the formal three criteria developed in the previous Commission decisions 
regarding the failing firm defence. The Commission had now accepted that even if the lack 
of causality is not shown through the fulfillment of the formal criteria, it can still be shown 
following a counterfactual analysis. This was not completely consistent with the decisional 
practice following the Kali and Salz decision where the “lack of causality” requirement 
had been assessed through the satisfaction of the criteria. However, the Commission was 
given the chance to clarify its position in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines where the 
failing firm defence was to be addressed. 
4.2.4. Horizontal Merger Guidelines: Formal Criteria and the Basic Requirement 
As previously discussed, the 2004 Merger Regulation was accompanied by the Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines set to clarify the Commission’s appraisal process under the SIEC 
test.
360
 Although the Guidelines are not binding, they are valuable in clarifying the 
Commission’s interpretation of the Merger Regulation and the appraisal of concentrations. 
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines are even more relevant when dealing with the failing 
firm defence which is not addressed in the Regulation itself.  The companies hoping to rely 
on the defence do not need to solely look at earlier decisions in order to estimate whether 
their transaction can be cleared, as the way in which the Commission assesses the failing 
                                                          
358
 Malinauskaite (2012), p. 315–316. See also Perpiñà (2015) who, however, is not criticising this, p. 108. 
359
 Oinonen (2013), p. 16. 
360
 See section 3.1.3. 
71 
 
firm defence is expressed now in the Guidelines.
361
 Paragraph 90 of the Guidelines states 
that the “Commission considers the following three criteria to be especially relevant for the 
application of a ‘failing firm defence’”. These criteria are discussed here in detail.  
According to the first criterion, “the allegedly failing firm would in the near future be 
forced out of the market because of financial difficulties if not taken over by another 
undertaking”.362 This criterion has remained fairly similar since its introduction in Kali and 
Salz, and its logic is similar to that of early US antitrust enforcement: the defence should 
be used only when the target company is actually on the verge of exit from the market. The 
Commission has not – and perhaps cannot – place a specific threshold which would 
pinpoint the financial agony needed to be met in order to satisfy this criterion. Instead, the 
assessment of this criterion takes place on a case-by-case basis.
363
 The Commission has not 
required that the bankruptcy proceedings should be underway at the time of the 
notification, but they must be imminent.
364
 Although not specified in the wording of the 
criterion, the Commission interprets it broadly. Not only is the failing company’s financial 
condition under scrutiny, but the livelihood of the industry, in which it operates, is also 
taken into account as well as the chances of structural reorganisation of the failing firm.
365
 
The first criterion is widely accepted among legal scholars, as the financial difficulties of 
the failing firm form the basis of the defence. It can also be considered to be more 
“certain” than the two other, more hypothetical, criteria.366 However, this criterion can be 
difficult for the parties to prove especially during an economic crisis when a failing 
company’s financial troubles can be confused with the general fall in market demand.367   
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The second criterion of the Horizontal Guidelines requires that “there is no less anti-
competitive alternative purchase than the notified merger”.368 The Commission will 
compare the market structure of the post-merger scenario with market structures that would 
follow in the case of other purchasers. The purpose is to establish whether there are other 
potential acquirers with whom the transaction would prove less problematic in terms of 
competitive harm. The parties should be able to show that they have done everything at 
their disposal to find less harmful buyer candidates, who have been given the opportunity 
to negotiate over the acquisition of the failing firm. In addition to that, all offers above the 
liquidation value should be taken into account, while the efficiencies that would follow 
from the transactions with different buyers should be used in deciding which of the offers 
is the least harmful to competition. During an economic crisis, this criterion might prove 
easier for the parties to establish, as there is likely to be less enthusiasm to buy failing 
businesses.
369
 Nonetheless, Kaplan criticises this criterion for directing the focus away 
from the financial difficulties.
370
 Moreover, the high burden of proof placed on the parties 
might cause the criterion to be left unfulfilled.
371
 
In BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim the Commission reformulated the third criterion which now 
holds, that “in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm would inevitably exit 
the market”.372 With the use of this criterion the Commission is interested in estimating 
whether the assets would stay in the market, be liquidated or be reallocated into other 
markets.
373
 As discussed above the Commission’s rationale adding this criterion was that 
the two first criteria are insufficient in completely ruling out that the assets of the failing 
company could not be acquired by third parties in the case of bankruptcy and return to the 
relevant market.
374
 This is a very demanding criterion to satisfy, partly because it is 
difficult for the parties to provide compelling evidence of the exit of the assets.
375
 In 
addition Perpiñà notes that whether, in fact, the division of the failing firm’s assets among 
competitors is always the less harmful scenario, is dependent on the structure of 
                                                          
368
 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 90. 
369
 Oinonen (2013), p. 9–10; OECD (2009), p. 184, 189; Malinauskaite (2012) p. 310. See also Baker & 
McKenzie (2009), p. 4. 
370
 Kaplan (1976) p. 648–649. 
371
 As the target company is in financial ruins and its scarce resources are used to find potential buyers its 
financial turmoil might aggravate. Perpiñà (2015), p. 106–107; Bavasso & Lindsay (2007), p. 192. 
372
 Guidelines, para. 90. See also BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim (see supra note 12). 
373
 OECD (2009), p. 32. 
374
 BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim (see supra note 12), para. 141. See also OECD (2009), p. 184; Kyprianides 
(2012), p. 579; Bavasso & Lindsay (2007), p. 186. 
375
 Oinonen (2013), notes that this criterion most often forms the obstacle for approving the defence, p. 11. 
73 
 
competition on the market.
376
 It should be noted that the inclusion of this criterion has 
followed from theoretical contributions regarding the defence, and academics, such as 
Campbell, who have emphasised the importance of the overall capacity in the appraisal of 
the defence. 
Although the inclusion of the failing firm criteria into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
brought transparency as to how the Commission is estimating the failing firm defence the 
the relationship between the criteria and the “lack of causality” requirement was not 
completely clarified. The question whether the fulfilment of these three criteria – originally 
introduced in Kali and Salz, reformulated in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim and now expressed 
in paragraph 90 of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines – is sufficient in order for the 
Commission to accept an anti-competitive merger on the basis of the failing firm defence 
continued to be debated. More precisely, which is the more important factor, meeting these 
criteria or fulfilling the basic requirement, now expressed in paragraph 89 of the 
Guidelines: “The basic requirement is that the deterioration of the competitive structure 
that follows the merger cannot be said to be caused by the merger”. Or do rescue mergers 
have to satisfy both the basic requirement and the formal criteria?
377
 
Kokkoris is confident that if a concentration is able to meet the formal criteria, it should be 
proclaimed compatible with the common market as the Commission uses these criteria to 
assess whether there is a lack of causality between the transaction and deterioration of 
competition.
378
 It seems that this thinking has been embraced in US merger control, as 
there the approval of the failing firm defence depends on whether the formal criteria is met, 
as the fulfilment of the criteria will in itself assure that the assets of the target company 
will remain in the market.
379
 
Paredes describes this as an absolute approach, and criticises it for the production of Type 
I (blocking a pro-competitive merger) and Type II (approving an anti-competitive merger) 
errors in US merger control. While the focus on the fulfilment of the formal criteria is easy 
to administrate because of its simplicity and cost-efficiency, it ignores market realities and 
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the actual effects that the merger, or the exit of the failing firm in question, is going to have 
on competition which should be the sole concern in merger control. These effects can only 
be taken into account through a case-by-case assessment.
380
  
Perpiñà agrees as he fears that mergers could be blocked or remedied also in the EU for 
not fulfilling the formal criteria, even if its approval would be the least anti-competitive 
solution. According to him, the appraisal of rescue mergers should be based on 
counterfactual analysis where the alternative scenarios are defined with time and effort. 
This would be compatible with the Commission’s more effects-based approach, as the 
circumstances of each specific case could be taken into account.
381
 
The Commission itself has noted that the “lack of causality between the merger and any 
worsening of competitive conditions is at the heart of the analysis”, and that “while 
especially relevant”, the formal criteria listed in paragraph 90 of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines “are not exclusive and exhaustive in establishing that a merging party is a 
failing firm”.382 Oinonen interprets this so that while the formal criteria might offer the 
merging parties “pedagogical value and predictability” in the sense that they can estimate 
the successfulness of possible failing firm arguments, the failing firm defence can be 
accepted even when the formal criteria is not met if the basic criterion is fulfilled. He goes 
a step further by stating, that it also means that even if a merger met all the conditions in 
paragraph 90, it should not be automatically accepted if it does not fulfil the basic 
requirement.
383
  
Oinonen’s argument is convincing, as in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochom the Commission 
considered the counterfactual scenarios to the merger after already establishing that the 
formal failing firm criteria were met. Most scholars seem to agree that the Commission’s 
approach endorsing the counterfactual analysis is reasonable. Although it may cause 
ambiguities in terms of legal certainty, it is the only way that the Commission is able to 
avoid turning the failing firm defence formalistic (or absolute) in which case the Type I 
and Type II errors Paredes is warning about would follow.  
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The formal criteria have not turned irrelevant even though the European Commission has 
approved mergers purely on the basis of counterfactual analysis. It seems that the 
Commission still uses these criteria to assess whether the basic criterion is fulfilled as 
Kokkoris suggest. However, it could be argued that the Commission is not willing to limit 
its options even if one or more of the formal criteria fails to be met. Rather, it seems that 
the Commission has embraced a more effects-based approach with the use of 
counterfactual analysis and is considering whether the approval of the merger is actually 
more beneficial in terms of competition than its blocking. 
4.3. Development of Defence in EU Merger Control during the Economic Crisis 
It is well-known that the relevance of the failing firm defence increases during times of 
economic unease as firms are finding it difficult to acquire proper funding and are faced 
with the prospect of bankruptcy.
384
 The economic downturn may force companies to 
abandon their less profitable operations due to overcapacity on the market caused by the 
decreasing demand.
385
 
However, the absence of more cases in which the parties would have successfully invoked 
the failing firm defence in front of the European Commission has led some to suspect that 
the conditions which the transaction must satisfy are very, if not even too, stringent.
386
 
These opinions grew more vocal as the economic crisis continued to distress European 
companies and the Commission became faced with increased pressure to amend its rules so 
that they would better respond to economic realities. This thinking included the idea that 
merger control and the Commission’s interpretation of the failing firm defence could be 
more lenient during an economic crisis.
387
 A more lenient approach could also be seen 
compatible with the welfare of consumers who would benefit in the long run from 
companies entering and intensifying competition in markets from which they could also 
exit if the financial crisis was forcing them to do so.
388
 
                                                          
384
 See e.g. Malinauskaite (2012), p. 311. 
385
 Baker & McKenzie (2009), p. 3–5. 
386
 Malinauskaite (2012), p. 315; Kyprianides (2012), p. 582; Bavasso & Lindsay (2007) p. 181, 192. See 
also Baccaro (2004) according to whom the Commission had accepted the defence only in “nearly self-
explanatory circumstances”, p. 11. 
387
 See e.g. Kokkoris (2014), p. 51–53; Malinauskaite (2012), p. 314; Lowe (2009), p. 22. Baccaro (2004), 
however, notes that the appraisal of failing firm defence is just as demanding in the United States apart from 
the failing division defence which has been accepted in the United States more leniently, p. 12.  
388
 Mason & Weeds (2012), p. 5. See also Kokkoris (2014) who notes that the Commission was able to 
accept the least harmful option and to loosen up its policy on state aid rules as European banks were in risk of 
drifting into a systemic crisis, p. 44. See also e.g. Nordström (2015) for a detailed discussion on this subject. 
76 
 
These demands have not received much sympathy from the European Commission, in fact, 
quite the opposite. The Commission has rejected the idea of a more lenient merger policy 
during an economic crisis noting that merging firms do not face a more severe test during 
economic booms either.
389
 The Commission believes that by resisting the pressure to ease 
its application of the Merger Regulation it has “set the foundation for a sustainable 
subsequent upturn”.390 Thus the Commission has continued to apply the existing merger 
control rules “while taking full account of the economic environment” maintaining that 
these rules “allow for all the necessary flexibility to deal with sometimes rapidly evolving 
market conditions”.391 Taking into account wider considerations, such as employment 
concerns, has been ruled out by the Commission as they are better addressed through 
instruments aimed especially towards them.
392
 Furthermore the Commission has stated that 
it has been able to take due notice of the dim market realities by “thoroughly analysing 
failing firm arguments”.393 This statement was based on the two decisions it took in the fall 
of 2013. 
4.3.1. Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery: Failing Division Doctrine Disregarded 
In early September of 2013 the third case in which the European Commission accepted a 
merger on the basis of the failing firm defence saw the light of day.
394
 The Commission 
cleared the concentration where Nynas acquired control over Shell’s Harburg Refinery on 
the basis that in the absence of the transaction the most likely scenario would have been the 
closure of the refinery assets which in turn would have led to higher prices for European 
consumers because of the significant reduction in the production capacity of the market.
395
 
Shell Deutschland Oil, part of Shell group consisting of energy and petrochemical 
companies active throughout the production chain, wished to get rid of its fuels and 
distillates refinery and a base oil manufacturing plant in Harburg. Nynas – a global 
producer of naphthenic base, process oils, transformer oils and bitumen – intended to lease 
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the base oil manufacturing plant and parts of the refinery for 25 years although the 
agreement included an option enabling to convert this arrangement into an asset deal. 
Because of the lasting basis of control Nynas would have acquired over the Harburg 
refinery assets it had to be notified to the Commission.
396
 
Because the relevant market was operated only by a limited set of competitors the 
transaction raised concerns as to its compatibility with the common market. However, 
unlike in other cases where the Commission had dealt with the failing firm defence 
discussed above, after a thorough definition of the relevant markets the Commission did 
not at any point of the decision conclude that the concentration would lead into Nynas 
having a dominant position in the markets and that it could be found incompatible with the 
common market. Instead after looking at the structure of competition as well as the 
development of supply and demand in each relevant market the Commission referred to the 
ECJ’s judgement in France and Others and noted that the deterioration of competition 
must be caused by the concentration the evaluation of which requires the use of 
counterfactual analysis.
397
 
Without a separate subheading called “failing firm defence” or “rescue merger” – or any 
mentioning of the parties failing firm arguments – as was the case in its previous decisions 
the Commission bluntly continued the build-up for its counterfactual analysis by referring 
to the formal failing firm criteria listed in paragraph 90 of the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines which it was going to use in its assessment of the causal link.
398
  
Compared to e.g. Aegean/Olympic II the Commission seemed able to conclude rather 
effortlessly that the failing firm criteria were met in the case at hand.
399
 The Commission 
became convinced by the economic evidence Shell had submitted that “it would be 
economically rational for Shell to close down the Harburg site” as continuing its operations 
would have been more costly. This together with the fact that Shell's decision to exit the 
market would be in line with its business strategy led the Commission to find it very likely 
that the Harburg refinery would be closed down and that the relevant assets would be 
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forced out of the market “if not taken over by another undertaking, because of their poor 
financial performance and because of Shell's strategic focus on other activities”.400 
Regarding the second criterion concerning an alternative purchaser Shell had shown that it 
had attempted to divest the Harburg refinery already during 2008–2010 without success. 
This enabled the Commission to find that the US Company Ergon was the only credible 
alternative purchaser of the Harburg refinery assets. Again Shell was able to show that it 
had in fact negotiated extensively with Ergon but these negotiations had ended without 
Ergon presenting a credible offer. After receiving the Commission’s SO outlining the 
potential concerns that arose from the transaction with Nynas Shell had even re-entered 
into negotiations with Ergon.
401
 However, the Commission came to the conclusion that 
Ergon actually would not have been an alternative purchaser following a decision to deny 
the deal with Nynas as Ergon already had overcapacity in its production and it was not able 
to show continued strategic interest in acquiring the Harburg site. According to the 
Commission this meant that there was “no prospect of a less anti-competitive alternative 
purchase of the Harburg refinery assets” than the deal with Nynas.402 
Effortless or not, the Commission did discuss the fulfilment of the first two failing firm 
criteria in some detail. As to the third criterion requiring the exit of assets of the failing 
company, however, the Commission simply found that the analysis of the first two 
conditions had shown that in the absence of the transaction Shell would most likely close 
down the refinery. As “rebuilding the Harburg refinery assets elsewhere would be 
prohibitively expensive and would take a very long time…the assets would most likely exit 
the market”.403 Thus all the formal failing firm criteria were considered to be met. 
It was only after concluding this that the Commission moved on to look at the impact the 
concentration was going to have in the relevant markets. This technique enabled the 
Commission to conclude that significant impediment to competition was not going to take 
place as compared to the scenario where Harburg refinery assets would exit the market the 
concentration was in fact preserving the existing production capacity and lower price level 
in the naphthenic and transformer oils market. The concentration was cleared on the basis 
of this counterfactual logic which had shown that “in the absence of the notified 
transaction, the Harburg refinery assets will most likely exit the market, which would be 
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much worse for the competitive structure of the relevant markets than the reasonably 
foreseeable effects of the concentration”.404 
Many writers have, however, questioned the Commission’s assessment of the failing firm 
criteria. Especially the inconsistency regarding the importance given to the financial health 
of the parent company, which is related to first criterion, has been criticised. The reasons 
for not assessing Shell’s viability, while in the Aegean/Olympic cases (discussed below) 
Marfin’s economic condition was thoroughly analysed and it was regarded essential in 
relation to its willingness to continue funding its subsidiary, have not been presented by the 
Commission. It has been speculated whether the Commission’s different approach could 
have followed from motives related to industrial policy as the refinery was the last of its 
kind in Europe. If the Commission should have assessed this criterion stringently in the 
case at hand it is likely that the first failing criterion would not have been met as the non-
profitability of the refinery, a relatively small asset would not have represented an obstacle 
to Shell, a global enterprise in good financial condition.
405
  
In relation to the first failing firm criterion I find it peculiar that, unlike in the 
Aegean/Olympic cases, the Commission did not address the matter of failing division 
defence. This is surprising as the Harburg refinery was even more clearly definable as a 
failing division. In earlier decisions regarding failing divisions the Commission had strictly 
demanded that the closure of the division should not be simply a “management decision” 
following from the unfulfilled expectations regarding the subsidiary’s profitability.406 Now 
the Commission seemed to emphasise the strategic interests of the parent company in 
accepting the first criterion. Whether this was related to industrial policy or not it does 
seem to represent a change in the Commission’s approach towards failing division 
arguments.
407
 
Moreover the fact that the “exit of assets” criterion was not dealt with in detail can be 
considered somewhat surprising. The logic according to which the third failing firm 
criterion is considered to be met on the basis that the two first criteria have been shown to 
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be satisfied could place the relevance of a separate third criterion in jeopardy.
408
 The 
Commission had not in its previous cases come to such a conclusion.  
In fact, the whole structure of the decision deviated from earlier decisional practice as the 
failing firm criteria was discussed in the midst of the competitive assessment before 
estimating the effects of the merger on the relevant markets. This saved the Commission 
from the trouble of justifying the acceptance of an anti-competitive merger as the negative 
aspects following from the concentration were not discussed in the decision. The 
Commission simply noted that the effects following from the acceptance of the merger 
were better in terms of competition compared to its denial. While this is compatible with 
the approach endorsing counterfactual analysis the deviation from earlier practice is left 
unexplained.  
The only criterion the appraisal of which seemed to be compatible with earlier cases was 
the one concerning alternative purchasers. One could argue that this criterion was 
relatively easy to fulfil as Ergon was the only considerable alternative purchaser. However, 
the parties were able to show that extensive negations had taken place between Shell and 
Ergon and explain the reasons for their failure as demanded by the earlier decisional 
practice of the Commission.  
4.3.2. Aegean/Olympic Saga and the Difficulty of Getting it Right 
When the acquisition of Olympic Air (Olympic) by its competitor Aegean Air (Aegean) 
was unconditionally approved in October 2013, it became the first time that the European 
Commission changed its mind over the same transaction in EU merger control history. The 
companies had proposed a merger already in 2011 but had then failed to get the 
Commission’s approval.409 
Aegean Airlines had started operating in 1999 and through its continuous growth it had 
become the largest airline in Greece while Olympic Air was witnessing financial 
difficulties, already before the economic crisis and the former state-owned airline had been 
sold to an investment company, Marfin Investment Group, in the fall of 2009. Under new 
ownership Olympic Air started to narrow down its operations and to concentrate on 
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domestic flights.
410
 Marfin, however, was not able to turn Olympic profitable and so 
merger talks between the two Greek airlines began which led into a notification in June 
2010 to the Commission. After a Phase II investigation the Commission, however, decided 
to prohibit the merger as it would have resulted in “a quasi-monopoly on the Greek air 
transport market” leading to higher prices. In particular there were nine domestic routes on 
which the new entity would have acted as the only operator which according to the 
Commission would have led “to the elimination of actual competition” while entry of new 
competitors that would have started to operate on these routes was considered unlikely. 
Although the parties offered remedies including slot releases in Greek airports the 
Commission estimated that these would have not been sufficient to remove the competition 
concerns.
411
  
Even though the parties did not invoke the failing firm defence explicitly the Commission 
found that their arguments dealt with the defence criteria and therefore decided to assess 
whether the transaction would have met the conditions of the defence.
412
 As a preliminary 
remark the Commission noted that Olympic was actually a single failing division of Marfin 
which itself was in good financial condition and its viability was not threatened by 
Olympic’s losses. However, whether the case concerned a failing firm or a failing division 
had “no bearing on the assessment by the Commission in this case.413 
The Commission did not believe that Olympic would exit the market in the absence of the 
merger. It estimated that Marfin was capable of offering further financial support and could 
not withhold this assistance from its subsidiary because of the risk of damaging its 
reputation. The Commission also refused to accept that the market would have been too 
small for two operators. Furthermore Olympic had restructuring options at its disposal 
which could have turned the company profitable in the absence of the merger. Thus, the 
Commission concluded that the first failing firm condition was not shown to be met.
414
 On 
hindsight, we are able to note that the Commission’s analysis was relying on a false 
conception of the Greek air transport market and the Greek economy in general. The 
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Commission expected the Greek economy and air traffic numbers to start growing in the 
following years but in reality the Greek GDP continued to decline rapidly which also 
decreased the demand for air passenger transport.
415
   
Regarding the second criterion the Commission held along the lines of earlier decisional 
practice that the parties had been unable to “identify the third parties with whom Marfin 
would have negotiated nor the reasons why the negotiations would have been 
unsuccessful” and dismissed the fulfilment of the criterion.416 In relation to the third 
criterion the Commission assessed that the assets that were in risk of exiting the market 
were the Olympic brand and logo and Olympic Air's slot and bilateral rights. Similarly as it 
had held in JCI/Fiamm the Commission believed that these assets were likely to shortly 
return to the relevant market in the case of Olympics’ liquidation. Therefore, the third 
criterion was interpreted to be unfulfilled.
417
  
In relation to the basic requirement demanding the lack of causality between the merger 
and the deterioration of the competitive structure the Commission did not perform a 
separate counterfactual analysis as it had done in JCI/Fiamm. Instead, following a line of 
earlier decisions which it had adopted after Kali and Salz, the Commission used its 
analysis of the three criteria to deduce that “the transaction would most likely deteriorate 
competition to a significant extent, well beyond the extent of the deterioration that could 
result were Olympic Air to exit the market”.418  
Although the Commission can be defended for being suspicious of failing firm claims 
when Marfin had acquired Olympic just nine months previously, and the formerly state-
owned subsidiary was still getting accustomed to a new business model, the decision has 
been criticised especially after the Commission reached the exact opposite result in 
Olympic/Aegean II.
419
 If the defence is turned down on the basis that the company has been 
under a new ownership for only a limited period of time – or the defence is otherwise seen 
to be interpreted excessively strictly – investors might hesitate to enter new markets. This 
                                                          
415
 Olympic/Aegean Airlines (see supra 167), paras. 369, 377. Greek GDP decreased by 7,3 per cent in 2012 
and by 5,8 per cent in 2013 while demand for domestic air passenger transport from Athens decreased by 26 
per cent from 2009 to 2012. Komninos & Jeram (2014), p. 610. See also European Commission, Press 
Release Aegean/Olympic II, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-927_en.htm.  
416
 The Commission referred to its decision in Bertelsmann (see supra note 305) and the ECJ’s decision in 
France and Others (see supra note 11) as it stressed the stringency of this criterion. Olympic/Aegean Airlines 
(see supra 167), paras. 2074–2075, 2086–2087. 
417
 Olympic/Aegean Airlines (see supra 167), paras. 2089, 2105–2106, 2110–2111, 2118–2119. See also See 
JCI/Fiamm (supra note 354), para. 809. 
418
 Olympic/Aegean Airlines (see supra 167), paras. 1980, 2120. 
419
 Aegean/Olympic II (supra note 17). 
83 
 
is the case especially with markets that can only accommodate a limited number of 
competitors as entering these markets is estimated to be risky and because the number of 
potential purchasers for failing businesses is limited. Thus in order to avoid the creation of 
unintended entry barriers investors should not be restricted to exit markets when they 
realise that they have made an unprofitable investment. Instead the theory of contestable 
markets suggests that investors should be able to trust that they can exit the market if losses 
are set to continue indefinitely. One can rightfully ask whether Marfin would have entered 
the Greek aviation market having known that it would not be able sell Olympic to its only 
potential buyer. If companies halt from entering markets from which they might later have 
to retreat from the increased competition that their entry would have created is lost whereas 
fair recognition of the failing firm defence enables it to take place even if the market turns 
less competitive again after the approval of a rescue merger.
420
  
Unlike in Kali and Salz the Commission refused to believe that the minimum efficient 
scale in the Greek aviation market would have demanded a (quasi-)monopoly market 
structure. According to the theory of contestable markets such a market structure is not 
problematic as new competitors will enter the market if the (quasi-)monopolist increases 
prices in the hope of monopoly profits.  
Komninos and Jeram believe that the Commission’s analysis failed because of its incorrect 
assessment of the Greek airline market. If the Commission had been able to predict the 
future development more accurately the failing firm argument might have had a better 
chance of succeeding.
421
 According to Perpiñà the case highlighted the problems related to 
the use of formal failing firm criteria whereas a counterfactual analysis could have 
produced the correct decision the first time around.
422
  
However, in 2013 as the Greek economy continued to decline the parties decided to give 
the merger another attempt which proved out to be successful.
423
 In addition to the 
economy in general, the circumstances regarding the parties themselves had changed 
drastically. Following cutbacks the turnovers of the parties had decreased to the extent that 
the concentration did not reach the turnover thresholds stipulated in Article 1 of the Merger 
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Regulation.
424
 Whereas in 2011 the parties had been competing on 17 routes from which 
the Commission had recognised competition concerns in nine, in 2013 there were overlaps 
only on seven routes from which the Commission assessed five to be problematic as there 
were no other competitors operating on those routes. However, maybe because of its 
earlier analysis of the market the Commission requested the Greek and Cyprian 
competition authorities to refer the case to it under Article 22(5) which the NCAs 
accepted.
425
 
Although the economic circumstances had turned grimmer – and had thus paved the way 
for a more likely acceptance of the failing firm defence – the Commission did not request 
the referral of the case in order to accept it more leniently.
426
 The Commission launched a 
Phase II investigation on similar grounds as in Olympic/Aegean Airlines.
427
 It concluded its 
competitive assessment by stating that the transaction “would lead to a significant 
impediment of effective competition in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position” on the five routes in question as the competitive 
constraint exerted by the parties on each other would be removed.
428
 Although entry of 
competitors on Greek domestic routes was not assessed to be likely this time either the 
Commission now accepted that Olympic was, in fact, a failing company.
429
  
The Commission began in its assessment regarding the defence by looking at the overall 
financial condition of Olympic and its parent company. This showed that “there can be 
little doubt” that Olympic had only survived “due to the continuous funding” of Marfin 
“and, more particularly, has not once been profitable since 2009 when Marfin re-launched 
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the company”. Furthermore the Commission noted that Marfin’s and its other subsidiaries’ 
financial condition had worsened radically over the last few years.
430
  
The Commission continued to interpret that Olympic was a failing division of Marfin but 
this time went even further in stating that “the legal status of the failing business has been 
of limited importance for its classification as a failing firm or a failing division”.431 
However, it could be argued that the fact that Olympic was seen as Marfin’s subsidiary had 
an impact on the Commission’s Aegean/Olympic decisions as Marfin’s financial condition 
played a massive role on both occasions.
432
 Indeed some would argue that Marfin’s 
financial condition was the only factor that had really changed during the course of time 
between the two notifications and it seemed to persuade the Commission to rethink its 
position on the matter.
433
 Even the Commission admitted that the classification of Olympic 
as a failing division formed a “part of first criterion of the failing firm analysis” which is 
why it appears misleading from the Commission to diminish the matter.
434
 
Be that as it may the Commission seized the opportunity to further clarify its position on 
the matter of what constitutes a failing division. The Commission stated that the 
classification was not dependent on whether the failing entity in question was a legal 
person or not “but rather on the rationale behind the concept of failing division”.435 
According to the Commission in the case at hand Olympic was seen to constitute a failing 
division as it was “sufficient to establish that Marfin would no longer be able to support 
Olympic”. Being classified as a failing division did not, however, require that Olympic 
would have endangered the viability of Marfin as this would have not corresponded to “the 
rationale underlying the failing firm analysis”, which concerned whether because of “the 
failure of the acquired company (and not necessarily of its parent)” the competitive 
structure would deteriorate also in the absent the merger.
436
 
As the Commission moved on to discuss the failing firm criteria it first of all found that it 
seemed “very likely” that Olympic would have continued to need further funding from 
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Marfin during the coming years.
437
 Compared to its previous estimate the Commission 
changed its opinion on whether Marfin was to be able to continue funding its loss making 
subsidiary. Furthermore even if Marfin would have been able to continue Olympic’s 
funding, according to the Commission, it lacked the strategic interest to do so as “Marfin 
cannot indefinitely cover Olympic's losses if the airline has no prospects of profitability in 
the foreseeable future”. Thus, the Commission found that the merger satisfied the first 
failing firm condition.
438
  
The Commission also made a complete turnover regarding the second criterion establishing 
that there had been “only rather limited credible interest” in Olympic from alternative 
purchasers in the past.
439
 It is worth noting that the Commission came to this conclusion by 
looking at previous attempts to sell Olympic before Marfin had purchased the airline. This 
suggests that the Commission could have reached the same result regarding the second 
criterion already in Olympic/Aegean Airlines.
440
 Similarly the Commission’s conclusion 
regarding the exit of Olympic’s assets was turned upside down as its market investigation 
showed that “none of the responding 20 European airlines stated that they had any interest 
in acquiring the Olympic brand” and that “no third party substantiated an interest for taking 
over Olympic's bilateral traffic rights”.441  
This time around the Commission included a separate section concerning counterfactual 
scenarios to its decision. Its analysis showed that although the transaction had anti-
competitive effects – namely those following from a “monopoly on the five routes of 
concern” – these effects were “similar to those which would in any event occur” in the 
absence of the merger. Therefore, the Commission found that the proposed merger was not 
the cause of deterioration of competition and could be accepted unconditionally.
442
 
Komninos and Jeram find it peculiar that the Commission chose to analyse the 
counterfactual scenarios as the competitive situation in the market was already assessed 
extensively while discussing the failing firm criteria. According to them in case the 
concentration meets the failing firm criteria, it is not necessary to study the anti-
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competitive effects any further since if the merger would not take place the failing firm 
would exit the market and there would not be any competition left between these firms.
443
  
Although these writers otherwise produce well-rounded arguments about the 
Aegean/Olympic saga, I believe their opinion on this matter is incorrect. It is true that the 
Commission did not perform a separate counterfactual analysis in cases following its 
decision in Kali and Salz as the “causal link” was assessed with the help of the criteria in 
them. However, in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim and in the cases that followed this decision a 
separate counterfactual analysis was performed regardless of whether the criteria were 
fulfilled or not. I.e. the Commission was not solely relying on the criteria when assessing 
whether the merger was causing the deterioration of the competitive structure.  
The counterfactual analysis is important both when the formal criteria is left unfulfilled as 
well as when the formal criteria is met in order to avoid the approval of anti-competitive 
mergers when there are more beneficial alternatives in terms of competition on display. 
The mere fact that the failing company would exit the market in the absence of the merger 
does not mean that competitive structure following from the approval of the merger would 
necessarily be better. Approving or denying a merger purely on the basis of the fulfilment 
of the formal failing firm criteria would lead into an absolute defence which is unsuited 
with the effects-based approach the Commission is otherwise pursuing.  
The fact that the Commission changed its mind about the merger in two years favours the 
critics who have claimed that its interpretation of the failing firm defence has been too 
strict. Although the Commission justified the different outcomes by referring to the 
circumstances, which had changed considerably worse by 2013, it can be argued that the 
transaction should have been accepted already in 2011. The European Commission’s 
inability to accept that the Greek airline market was not any more sustainable for two 
companies in 2011, i.e. after the economic crash the minimum efficient scale demanded 
that the market is operated by a single airline, seems to suggest that the Commission was 
not willing to rely on the theory of contestable markets, which it had followed when 
accepting rescues merger. Instead other theories such as ordoliberalism and its notion of 
complete competition – fear of market structures where there is only a dominant company 
that is able to determine the market price on its own – seem to have gained the upper hand.  
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On the other hand, one should note that competition authorities cannot review failing firm 
arguments too leniently as this could lead to the approval of anti-competitive mergers the 
restriction of which is more favourable in terms of competition. The failing firm defence 
presents a difficult test for competition authorities as finding the right balance between too 
harsh and overly lenient rescue merger test is not easy. The Commission has rightly 
regarded failing firm arguments with suspicion and assessed them rigorously. But 
Olympic/Aegean Airlines can be used as a reminder of what follows if passing the failing 
firm defence becomes unreasonably difficult: Type I errors where mergers that do not 
cause the deterioration of competition are blocked.  
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5. Conclusions  
The aim of this thesis was to clarify, how have the decisions regarding the failing firm 
defence, which the European Commission adopted during the recent economic crisis, 
affected the failing firm defence doctrine that had been previously established in EU 
merger control. It can be argued, that the European Commission has followed a rather 
consistent effects-based approach while reviewing failing firm arguments invoked by 
merging parties. Ever since its initial approval of the defence in Kali and Salz the 
Commission has insisted that the defence should only be accepted when there is a lack of 
causality between the merger and the deterioration of the competitive structure following 
from it. Although the Commission has developed the (formal) failing firm criteria, which 
concentrations should generally meet in order to be accepted under the failing firm 
doctrine, these criteria were, according to my interpretation, only set for the assessment of 
this causality. This is how the Commission assessed the first cases that followed its Kali 
and Salz decision: as the Kali and Salz criteria were not met in any of them the 
Commission concluded that a causal link did exist between the concentrations and the anti-
competitive effects following from them and decided to block them or require remedies 
from the merging entities.  
However, the Commission’s method of assessing the “causal link” placed the formal 
failing firm criteria at the centre of its analysis, which is probably why it has been 
interpreted that the satisfaction of these criteria was not just a tool to assess causality 
between mergers and deterioration of competition. Because of this, the later decisional 
practice of the Commission, in which it used counterfactual analysis to estimate whether 
there indeed existed a causal link, created confusion as to whether the parties invoking the 
defence were demanded to show, that their merger satisfied both the formal criteria and the 
“lack of causality” requirement, which was assessed through counterfactual analysis.  
According to my understanding, the failing firm defence can be accepted in EU merger 
control purely on the basis of satisfying the “lack of causality” requirement as the formal 
criteria is used only as a tool to assess whether this basic requirement is fulfilled. In other 
words, the formal criteria do not need to be fulfilled for the defence to be accepted and, 
even though the formal criteria would be met, this does not guarantee the acceptance of the 
defence, as counterfactual analysis is needed to estimate whether the basic requirement is 
satisfied. 
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The cases, in which the Commission accepted the use of the failing firm defence during the 
economic crisis, did not bring a change to this founding principle of the doctrine. Despite 
the striking simultaneousness of the two cases they went through a very different type of 
appraisal process. Even though in Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery the Commission used the 
formal failing firm criteria in its assessment concerning the causal link between the merger 
and the deterioration of the competitive structure it never stated that the parties would have 
invoked the defence. Moreover this assessment was performed before the Commission had 
looked at the effects that the concentration would have on competition. The structure of the 
decision relieved the Commission from concluding that the transaction was anti-
competitive as when compared with the effects following from the counterfactual scenario 
the approval of the concentration was seen to enable the preservation of aggregative output 
and lower market prices. In Aegean/Olympic II the lack of causality between the merger 
and the deterioration of the competitive structure was also shown through the fulfilment of 
the formal failing firm criteria and confirmed by looking at the counterfactual scenarios, 
which produced the same outcome. However, the structure of the decision represented a 
more traditional failing firm doctrine following the line of the BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim 
decision. Both cases, however, were cleared on the basis that no causal link existed 
between the merger and the anti-competitive effects. This reaffirmed that the Commission 
is not following an absolute defence where the satisfaction of the formal criteria would be 
enough to clear the merger. In this respect the Commission’s application has stayed 
unchanged.  
The 2013 cases were important in restoring faith – that some already seemed to have given 
up – on the Commission’s ability to clear mergers on the basis of the defence. Moreover, 
both cases seem to represent a more lenient approach towards the failing division doctrine. 
Whereas the Commission had in its earlier decisions demanded that the exit of the division 
should not be caused by a mere management decision of the parent company it was now 
willing to look at the strategic incentives of the parent companies to continue funding their 
loss-making subsidiaries. In Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery this was essential, as the 
outcome regarding the fulfilment of the first criterion would have turned out very different 
if the assessment had concerned Shell’s financial condition. For some reason – industrial 
policy considerations have been suggested – the Commission did not perform such an 
assessment. The opposite was true for Marfin, the financial condition of which might have 
been the decisive factor for the Commission to reach an opposite conclusion compared to 
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its 2011 decision. But even in Aegean/Olympic II the strategic interests of Marfin were 
considered by the Commission unlike in previous cases concerning failing divisions. 
Whether or not the economic crisis played a role in this change of practice is difficult to 
assess. The Commission may have simply realised that its earlier approach regarding the 
failing division defence was too demanding and could have reached the same conclusion 
similarly during a period of economic growth. Stringent application of the failing division 
defence will, according to the theory of contestable markets, lead to the creation of exit 
barriers and investors may become cautious about investing in markets from which exit is 
uncertain. The fact that the Commission refused to accept the merger of Aegean and 
Olympic in 2011, and performed a thorough competitive analysis also in 2013, goes to 
show that the Commission’s assessment was not being affected by social considerations. 
Nevertheless, the crisis can be credited for causing so severe economic circumstances to 
European companies, that the Commission got the opportunity to further develop the 
failing firm doctrine on two occasions. Similarly during the economic crisis failing firm 
arguments were presented in mergers belonging to the jurisdiction of NCAs.
444
 
The idea, that a merger can be accepted when anti-competitive effects are to follow even in 
the absence of the transaction, was created in US case law. However, even though being 
influenced by it, the application of the failing firm defence in EU merger control differs 
from the doctrine applied in the US in a few aspects. Unlike the Commission’s decisional 
practice, the early US case law was not based on the comparison between the approval and 
the rejection of the defence and their effects on competition. Instead the initial approval of 
the defence in US case law was influenced by social considerations: as competition would 
reduce anyway following the inevitable exit of the failing firm the approval of an anti-
competitive merger was used to further employment and the interests of shareholders who 
would have suffered from the bankruptcy. No comparison was performed as to whether the 
exit of the failing company could actually be followed by a more pro-competitive outcome, 
e.g. the division of the failing company’s assets between smaller competitors in the market. 
The European Commission has refused to let such social considerations to have an effect 
on its decisions regarding rescue mergers. 
                                                          
444
 See e.g. Ruokakesko Oy / Suomen Lähikauppa Oy (supra note 376) and the Decision of Konkurrensverket 
of 24 October 2011 Arla Foods/Milko. 
92 
 
Although the formal criteria for the acceptance of the failing firm defence was also set in 
US merger control its application has been different. Whereas the Commission has not 
considered that the non-fulfilment of the formal criteria would be a reason to automatically 
dismiss rescue merger claims and on the other hand has performed a counterfactual 
analysis even when the formal criteria has been met, the US approach has been described 
more formalistic or absolute: the approval of the defence is dependent on the satisfaction of 
the formal criteria.  
The differences between the two jurisdictions are at least partly explainable through the 
eras under which the failing firm defence developed in them. Whereas early US case law 
was still mostly dealing with the notions of neoclassical economics the European 
Commission has had the privilege to lean on more modern schools of thought while 
developing its failing firm doctrine. Moreover the European Commission has been able to 
learn from the “mistakes” made on the other side of the Atlantic, as the defence was 
extensively debated – primarily in US – legal literature before being ever invoked in 
Europe. During this debate the failing firm defence developed into having a more 
economic basis which the European Commission was able to adopt early on. This basis 
was also compatible with the effects-based approach which the Commission otherwise did 
not adopt until the 2004 Merger Regulation. Thus the fact that the Commission adopted 
such an approach towards the failing firm defence already during the 1990’s under the 
dominance test can be considered remarkable.  
In merger cases intervention by the European Commission is based on the theories of 
competitive harm. However, EU merger control and the Commission’s failing firm 
doctrine seem to have been influenced by a variety of theories discussed above. The 
Commission uses the notion of market power to deduce whether concentrations raise 
serious doubts as suggested by neoclassical economics. Harvard School possibly had an 
impact on the creation of EU merger control, as during its most influential period the 
Commission seemed become interested in monitoring market transactions and use the 
competition law provisions of the Treaty of Rome to do this. EU merger control still uses 
market structure and market concentration as a starting point in its appraisal process. 
However, Harvard School theories concerning market concentration would not allow 
rescue mergers to take place, which is why it has not had much of an influence on the 
application of the failing firm defence in EU merger control. 
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Chicago School together with its notion of economic efficiencies influenced the debate in 
legal literature concerning the failing firm defence after which the defence developed into 
having a more economically sound reasoning. This undoubtedly has had an impact on the 
development of the effects-based failing firm doctrine of the European Commission. 
However, the Commission’s merger control is said to have been hostile towards efficiency 
claims before the adoption of the current Merger Regulation and moreover EU competition 
policy’s consumer welfare goal is at odds with the total welfare model favoured by 
Chicago School. Hence, EU merger control has not embraced Chicago School’s thinking at 
large.  
The theory of contestable markets seems to have been especially influential in the 
European Commission’s decisions in which the failing firm defence has been accepted. 
The Commission decisions to approve monopoly market structures on the basis of the 
failing firm defence in Kali and Salz and in BASF/Eurodiol/Pantochim are compatible with 
the theory. The same holds true for the recent amendment in the assessment of the failing 
division defence: parent companies can exit markets, which are not at the core of their 
strategies, when their investments prove unprofitable. 
Freiburg School and ordoliberalism, although unquestionably important in the 
development of EU competition law, do not seem to have played a central role in the 
creation of the Commission’s failing firm doctrine. This is not surprising when considering 
that ordoliberalism and its goal of complete competition reject monopolistic market 
structures. On the other hand, their influence might explain why the European Commission 
has been difficult at times to be persuaded by failing firm and especially by failing division 
arguments. 
